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4abstract
Kenya’s North Rift Region continuous to suffer from violent conflict in which a series of actors are 
involved. Armed groups perform widespread and devastating raids against neighbouring communities. 
The strength of these warrior groups varies regionally and from case to case. Security operations are 
often typified by disproportionate brutality. Power figures are known to instigate violence or organise 
and finance armed militias. 
Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia bore the brunt of the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008. The violence 
mainly pitted Kalenjin warrior groups against Kikuyu communities in a struggle over political injustices 
and power but also over economic discrepancies and feelings of ethnic antagonism. 
Turkana is the most northern district of the North Rift Region. In the course of 2009 and 2010 the district 
proved to be the most violent in the entire North Rift. Here, Turkana, Pokot, Nyangatom,  Toposa and 
other militias confront each other violently over livestock, pasture and disputed borderlands. Police 
and military are likewise involved in large scale violence and are known to distribute weapons and 
ammunition to the different warrior groups. Increased attacks and counter attacks in combination 
with security operations brought about endless cycles of violence motivated by amongst others ethnic 
antipathies, survival strategies and commercial incentives. 
Samburu and Laikipia were at the epicentre of pastoral conflict and excessive disarmament operations 
in 2009 and 2010. A series of events in which Pokot, Samburu and Borana militias were involved 
resulted in an unusual number of deadly casualties and displaced. They also brought about unseen 
violent disarmament operations resulting in widespread human rights violations. Here too, violence is 
motivated by political and economic considerations and aspects of tradition.
Throughout the North Rift the complicity of power figures, administrators and politicians in armed 
violence proves to be a very interesting yet difficult issue. It is believed that politicians and local 
prominent figures foment violence and organise armed militias for various purposes. 
51. introduction
In this publication we deal with patterns of conflict and violence in Kenya’s North Rift Region. We present 
the backgrounds and actors that make up this conflict from the beginning of 2008 until 2010. To do so 
we focus on specific events that are typical for the geographical area of our research. Consequently, this 
report will only deal with a limited number of cases. This shortcoming is the unavoidable result of a well-
considered choice to focus on events that, although separated in both space and time, show remarkably 
similar patterns. As a result this report is not an exhaustive account of conflict and its undercurrents 
across the North Rift. Rather it is an attempt to, through an analysis of actors, roles and motivations 
reveal what underlies conflict in this region. It indicates recurrent issues and pinpoints cases that call for 
further investigation rather than presenting sweeping conclusions and solutions. 
The North Rift Region comprises the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster – which corresponds to the 
Turkana, West-Pokot and Trans-Nzoia districts – and the Uasin Gishu, Marakwet, Keiyo, Samburu and 
Laikipia districts1. This vast area of ambiguous borderlands and disputed farmlands and pastures covers 
the entire Kenyan North-West and is home to a variety of ethnic communities and conflicting parties. 
Indeed, these do sometimes overlap. All of them are involved in a violent struggle with their neighbours 
or the Kenyan state and its representatives. Warrior militias from different ethnic origin violently confront 
each other but also target civilian populations in peripheral towns and villages in, for example Turkana, 
Samburu and West-Pokot Districts. Discontented communities arm and organize themselves against 
migrant populations in, amongst others Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia and Marakwet. Security personnel 
act brutally and in disregard of international law and human rights against civilians in Samburu and 
elsewhere. Politicians and administrators act as instigators, facilitators and organizers. 
In a first, short chapter we will present the areas that are the geographical focus of our study. This means 
that we will briefly introduce Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Samburu, Laikipia and Turkana Districts. We chose 
to focus on these areas in the North Rift  because they bare the brunt of conflict in the region and thus 
provide us with the most relevant and interesting cases. 
Under a next title the different parties are presented. A background to their origins is given. Their location, 
organisation, strategies and official objectives as well as their actions will be discussed. We will also, be 
it very briefly introduce and refer to issues we will treat in our analytical chapter. 
The final chapter is an analysis of illustrative incidents and confrontations based on a two month field 
research, interviews and a consultation of existing documentation. This analysis tries to combine these 
elements to answer the question why certain actors take up certain roles and operate in specific areas 
and from there tries to unveil the motivations that underpin their actions. In doing so we will pinpoint 
comparable patterns and compelling, returning undercurrents of conflict across the North Rift.   
As any research on conflict this one is subject to questions of veracity and actuality. As we often have to 
rely on interviews and reports of events that are already behind us, we are analysts of  past events that 
have been interpreted several times. Hence, to construct a research on these implies a certain risk of 
verifiability. Although all research is undertaken with the most vigilance and accuracy we are fully aware 
of this risk and are thus open to any further remarks.
1 This ‘definition’ of the North Rift Region is a highly personal one not necessarily based on an official precept but on a generally 
accepted description and the need to find a straightforward term to depict the geographical area of the research.  
62. Conflict areas 
2.1  trans-nzoia & uasin gishu 
Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu districts are respectively situated in the South-West and South of the 
North Rift Region. Trans-Nzoia  borders Uganda to the West and Uasin Gishu to the South. It is part of 
the Kenyan side of the Karamoja-cluster. The administrative capital and main commercial hub in the 
area is Kitale. Uasin Gishu District is the most southern district of the area we have demarcated here 
as the North Rift. Its capital is the town of Eldoret. Both districts are traditionally inhabited by Kalenjin 
(sub) communities. Today, Uasin Gishu has a mixed population with the majority being Kalenjin (mostly 
Nandi) and others being Kikuyu, Luhya, Kisii and Luo while Trans-Nzoia  has a majority Luhya population, 
with others being Kalenjin (mostly Pokot), Turkana, Kikuyu and Kisii. Uasin Gishu’s total population is at 
about 622000 while Trans-Nzoia has 575 662 residents according to the 1999 census.
Both districts were at the epicenter of a series of violent confrontations and incidents that came in 
the wake of 2007 general elections. Election related violence is endemic to the area ever since the 
introduction of multi-party politics back in 1991. This time, in Uasin Gishu the most affected areas were 
Kiambaa, Munyaka, Langas, Yamumbi, Burnt Forest, Eldoret Town, Cheptiret, Turbo and some others. 
In Trans-Nzoia  the most severely affected areas were Gituamba, Timbora Location in Saboti Division, 
Geta Farm, Kalaa, Makutano and Waumini near Kitale town. Trans-Nzoia   further struggled with security 
problems throughout the following two years. These were mainly related to ongoing confrontations 
between armed pastoralist groups – Pokot, Ugandese Toposa, Turkana etc. – and  incidents between 
these groups and Kenyan civilians most of whom are Luhya. 
Refugee squatters in Uasin Gishu. (Photo: Jan Van den Broeck,  2009).
72.2  samburu & laikipia 
Samburu District is situated at the eastern border of the Rift Valley Province and North Rift Region. It 
borders Marsabit and Isiolo in Eastern Province to the North-East, East and South. It shares borders in 
Rift Valley Province with Turkana (North-West), Baringo (South-West) and Laikipia (South, South-West). 
Maralal is the capital of the District. Another important hub is Archer’s Post in the eastern corner of the 
district near Isiolo and Baragoi, north of Maralal. Most of the area is Arid and Semi Arid Land (ASAL). As 
the district’s name already suggests, the area is traditionally considered to be home to the Samburu 
people, a pastoral community related to the more famous Maasai. Though the Samburu are the majority, 
the district hosts several other communities – Rendille, Turkana, Borana, Somali, Pokot, Kikuyu and Meru 
– too. The total population is at almost 2240002.  
At least six communities live in Laikipia. These communities are the Kikuyu, Maasai, Kalenjin, Turkana, 
Samburu and Pokot. In total they number almost 400 000 according to the 2009 census results. Kikuyu 
form about 60% of the population3. The district borders Samburu and Isiolo to the North, Meru to the 
East, Nyeri and Nyandura to the South and Baringo and Nakuru to the West. Its capital is Nanyuki.
Unlike Trans-Nzoia  and Uasin Gishu, Samburu and Laikipia did not bare the brunt of the post election 
violence in 2007-2008. However, intercommunal conflict is perennial in the area. Conflicts ebb and flow 
since the 1960’s4. Recently, both districts experienced heavy increases of conflict with a large number 
of incidents and confrontations in which both pastoral armed groups and security personnel were 
involved.
2.3 turkana 
Turkana District, the largest district in the North Rift, comprises a considerable part of Kenya’s Arid and 
Semi Arid Lands. It is situated in the northwestern part of Kenya to the West of Lake Turkana. It borders 
Ethiopia to the Northeast, Sudan to the Northwest and Uganda to the West and the Kenyan districts 
West Pokot and Baringo to the Southeast and Marsabit to the East. Its capital is the town of Lodwar. 
Turkana has a population of 450860 according to the 1999 census. The district is considered to be home 
to the Turkana ethnic community. 
However, with common borders between Kenya, Uganda and Sudan not demarcated and huge tracts of 
land disputed, the so called ‘traditional’ occupation of these lands by the Turkana is contested. This brings 
about cross border conflicts in which primarily Toposa, Nyangatom, Dassantech, Dodoth and Turkana 
confront each other. Especially the disputed Elemi-triangle –  essentially a “broad belt of dangerous no-
man’s-land” between South-Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia – and the adjacent Turkana North District – where 
violence is concentrated along the Ugandan and Sudanese border near the towns of Nadapal (and the 
Nadapal corridor), Lokichoggio and Oropoi and further more along the Mogila Range and “around the 
escarpment that divides Turkana North and the Ugandan plateau” are extremely violent56. Next to these 
conflicts, Turkana pastoralists are in conflict with Kenyan pastoralists – Pokot, Borana etc. – as well. 
All of this has resulted in a severe situation of insecurity that is beyond any doubt the worst in the entire 
North Rift Region. In 2010 at least 65% of killings in Kenya’s pastoral areas took place in Turkana District. 
Also in 2009 the district had the highest level of deadly casualties7. 
2 http://gusii.com/2010/08/kenyas-population-census-2010.html, 02 March 2010
3 Ibid. 
4 Telephone Interview IPIS with Lesorogol Carolyn, Conflict in Samburu and Laikipia,  4 April 2011. 
5 Personal Communication with Eulenberger I., April 2010 (email)
6 Bevan, J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2008, pp. 23-26.
7 OCHA Kenya, Trackings of Killings and Displacement in Pastoral Areas: Annual Review 2010, OCHA Kenya, 2010; OCHA Kenya, 
Intensity of Pastoralists Fatalities in Kenya by District, OCHA Kenya IMU,  04 February 2010.
83. Conflicting Parties
Since this study covers a significant regional and social scope, it treats an equally significant number of 
actors. We chose to focus on a number of specific actors involved in a number of specific events. This 
allows us to reveal comparable patterns in conflict and conflicting parties in the North Rift Region. 
3.1 ethnic communities and their warrior militias
Conflict in the North Rift is often understood as a matter of ethnic calamities. A first glimpse upon violence 
in the region indeed reveals a number of ethnically motivated confrontations and incidents. Kalenjin 
organize and arm themselves to confront Kikuyu communities in Uasin Gishu. Samburu and Borana 
have a history of conflict that has largely developed along ethnic lines and so on. Calls on ethnic identity 
are an unquestionable part of most conflicts in the area. Consequently, in a report on conflict in Kenya’s 
North West – or throughout the entire country for that matter – it is impossible to go without discussing 
ethnicity or ethnic confrontations. Social life, thus also conflict, is steeped with ethnic innuendos. Ethnic 
affiliation often defines one’s possibilities in the social, economic and political spectrum. In this context 
however, it is equally important to recognize how ethnic antagonisms are more often than not generated 
and highlighted against a (post)colonial political and economic background (BOX 1)8.
Conflicting communities in the North Rift Region are mostly pastoral groups of which the Turkana, 
Samburu, Borana and Pokot, a Kalenjin ‘sub-tribe’, are the most prominent. Other important Kalenjin 
communities, like the Nandi and Kipsigis have a history of pastoralism but have long since become 
sedentary. Non-Kenyan pastoralists in the region are the Ugandan Dodoth and Jie and Sudanese 
Toposa, Didinga and Nyangatom. There is also a significant presence of Somali communities and warrior 
groups9. 
8 Despite the fact that conflict in North Rift appeals to aspects of identity we find it crucial to acknowledge that a presentation 
of conflict in North Rift as solely ethnically motivated is highly problematic. To report of conflict in the North Rift as a conflict 
between rivalling ethnic communities for the sake of incompatible ethno-cultural differences would be an irresponsible 
simplification. 
9 Bevan J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2008, pp. 22-29.
Police helicopter during security operation in Samburu (Photo: Tina Ramme, 2009).
9Although unmistakably diverse, pastoral communities share the following characteristics10:
They mostly live on arid or semi-arid lands and rely on livestock and mobility for their livelihoods.•	
Since livestock depend on pastures for their diet, pastoralists undertake seasonal migrations in •	
search for qualitative pasture and water to sustain their herds.
These migrations bring about intercommunal contact and cause competition and disputes over •	
access to and management of natural resources which are traditionally negotiated through flexible 
and reciprocal arrangements.
In Kenya and elsewhere the word “pastoralist” is used to refer to a broad scope of ethnicities regardless •	
of the fact whether or not one makes a living through pastoralist activities11. Hence, beyond reference 
to livelihoods, pastoralism appeals to aspects of identity12.
During the last decades pastoralists have been pushed more and more towards the peripheries of •	
their respective nation-states. This has resulted in chronic underdevelopment, marginalization and 
tremendous hardships and pressures on the communities. 
In the social and political organisation of most North Rift (pastoral) groups, age sets are central. These 
are regional phenomena that cut across ethnic lines. Despite differences in importance, rigidity and 
form they can be found among the Samburu, Turkana, and all ‘sub-tribes’ of the Kalenjin community. The 
institution divides the male population of a community in a number of subsequent age sets often with 
a cyclical pattern13. Of these, the warrior set is particularly important. It is in power for a period of about 
15 years after which it retires and the next set below it takes over after an elaborate circumcision and 
initiation ritual. During the post election violence of 2007 and 2008 around Eldoret, Uasin Gishu most of 
the violence ascribed to the Nandi community was committed by so called ‘Nandi’ or ‘Kalenjin Warriors’, 
10 Kimani M.J., Access-Management-Ownership: The ‘Water and Pasture Menu’ in Pastoralist Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa 
(GhoA), paper presented at: ‘Natural Resource Conflict in Africa-Is Water the New Oil?’ United Nations Conference Centre, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 – 14 November 2008, p.5. 
11 Just like sedentary Kalenjin communities like the Nandi still refer to themselves as pastoralists and consider cows sacred, 
pastoralists may be wage labourers, tradesmen, students etc. in Nairobi, Mombassa, Nakuru or in one of Kenya’s peripheral 
cities and commercial hubs. Nevertheless some of them might still consider themselves pastoralists. 
12 Krätli, S. and Swift, J., Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, 1999, p.1.
13 Ng’ang’a W., Kenya’s Ethnic Communities: Foundation of the Nation. Nairobi: Gatundu Publishers Limited, 2006.
the Kalenjin: Construction of an ethnic identityBox 1. 
The Kalenjin are a conglomeration of communities (Kipisigis, Nandi, Tugen, Pokot, Marakwet, Keiy and Sabaot) 
melted and forged against a political background in the fifties. Kalenjin ethnic identity is the indefinite outcome 
of an interplay between cultural, political and economic processes. Kalenjin antipathies towards the Kikuyu 
community have their roots in issues over land, land acquisition, land usage and resource generation that 
come from colonial and post-colonial land policies and are highlighted, (re)created and reaffirmed in times 
of heightened political competition as we will demonstrate below. Colonial rule imposed and postcolonial 
administration maintained rigid administrative boundaries around largely imagined identity groups. In their 
adaptation to these socio-political changes the communities of the North Rift have come to internalize the 
externally imposed understanding of ethnic identities as administrative entities. 
Today, communities feel bound to a well demarcated area not merely administratively and politically but also 
with regard to their ethnic identities. Today, most Samburu reside in Samburu District which is often referred 
to as ‘Samburu Land’. The Turkana consider Turkana District to be their ancestral home, the Pokot think of 
West-Pokot as their homeland and Nandi speak of ‘Nandi Land’. All of this goes together with – recently 
developed – ideas of ancestral belonging, rightful ownership over and access to resources, injustices in land 
acquisition and so on1.
1 For a more detailed account of colonial and post colonial policies and their relations with the genesis and rigidification 
of ethnic identities and ethnic affiliations to land and resources see: Van den Broeck, J., “It’s how they do their politics” 
The Roots and Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict around the Kenyan Town of Eldoret. Leuven, Catholic University of Leuven, 
2010. 
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members of the Kimyigei age group (boys and men between 15 and 30 years old who took over the more 
arduous duties of the older) and the Cheplelach age group (men between 30 and 45 or senior warriors)14. 
Historically, warrior groups have been of great importance in the organisation of a community for 
security, war and cattle raiding activities. Even today traditional cultural structures continue to provide a 
framework for organisation during violent confrontations with neighbours, the state or others15. On the 
other hand, as we will demonstrate below, it is interesting to study the developments around and within 
this institution against a background of fundamental societal change. 
There is a wide variety in the strength of armed warrior groups. Their actual numbers are often subject 
to a lot of uncertainty and discussion. They can range from just a couple to gangs of tens, hundreds and 
even thousands. In January 2008 large groups  up to 2000 armed Kalenjin attacked Kikuyu settlements in 
Uasin Gishu16. On the 15th of September 2009 at least 400 armed Pokot attacked a number of Samburu 
enclosures along the Laikipia-Samburu border killing 21 at the spot while a few months later 4 armed 
Nyangatom men raided a Turkana homestead and killed one man1718. The actual size of warrior militias 
is likely dependent on the motivations underpinning their actions and the purpose their attacks are 
supposed to serve. 
By the same token, the warrior’s equipment varies regionally and from case to case. During the post 
election violence warrior groups in Uasin Gishu mostly relied on traditional weaponry such as spears, 
bows and arrows, pangas and rungus19. They also used petrol bombs to burn down houses20. Of 230 
reported casualties only 28 died of gunshot wounds21. Guns are relatively rare in Uasin Gishu. In the 
neighbouring districts of Turkana, Trans-Nzoia  and West-Pokot fire arms are much more widespread. 
There, armed groups rely mainly on cheap and easy-to-use rifles like the G3 or AK-47 and other common 
assault rifles22. This is confirmed in the Small Arms Review report of 200823. Another SAR report suggests 
that in Turkana North small arms are used in 96.9 per cent of raiding events in the border region between 
Kenya and Sudan24. It has also been reported that raiders in Turkana are sometimes equipped with 
heavier military equipment such as grenades and RPG’s in Turkana25.
A study of violent events in the area reveals an array of violent conduct ranging from unnoticed and 
clandestine rustling and theft with little or no violence on the one end and overt use of excessive 
violence and indiscriminate killing and murder the other26. The former can be illustrated by a Samburu 
attack on a Turkana enclosure on the 22nd of May 2010 that resulted in the loss of a large number 
of cows. An example of the latter is the devastating attack on the Kikuyu settlement of Kiambaa near 
Eldoret, Uasin Gishu on the 15th of September 2008 during which large groups of highly organized 
armed Kalenjin men burned down the village, locked up dozens in the community church and set it 
ablaze. At least 20 people died in the inferno. Other were hacked or stabbed to death while trying to 
escape the tragedy27. 
14 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August – September 2009. 
15 Ibid. For more information see: Akiwumi Commission, The Akiwumi Report, Nairobi, 1999;  International Crisis Group, Kenya In 
Crisis, 2008;  Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008.
16 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August-September 2009.
17 OCHA Kenya, 32 Die in Cattle Raids, OCHA Kenya, 17 September 2009.
18 Africa Peace Forum, Peace and Conflict Updates, 08 January 2010.
19 The word Panga is the Kishwahili equivalent of machete while rungu can be translated as a club. It is mostly  a wooden club with 
a narrow handle and a large knob at the end.  
20 Confidential interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, Rift Valley Province, August-September 2009.
21 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008, p.313.
22 Leff J., Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region, International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence, Vol.3, No.2, 2009, pp.188-203.
23 Bevan  J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2008.
24 McEvoy C. & Murray R., Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North, 
Small Arms Survey, 2008.
25 Bevan J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Small Arms Survey, June 2008, p.28; Africa Peace 
Forum, Peace and Conflict Updates, Africa Peace Forum, 08 January 2010; Eulenberger I., Report on the peace and reconciliation 
emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st 
November 2009, 2009, pp.39-40
26 OCHA Kenya, Trackings of Killings and Displacement in Pastoral Areas: Annual Review 2010, OCHA Kenya, 2010.
27 Interviews conducted in Kiambaa, Uasin Gishu District, September 2009.
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Traditionally, these warrior militias are autonomous, non-hierarchical units with little central command. 
Nevertheless, again during the post election violence in Uasin Gishu District young warriors violently 
confronted their neighbours while the elders sometimes provided them with the necessary (moral) 
support, directions and guidance. “Elders were guiding them in going to war”28. “They would give a form 
of moral support by emphasizing the act of community”29. 
'The act of community' is what is often said to drive these warrior groups. The institution serves “to get 
the people together”30. Warrior militias represent the entire community, its stakes and its socio-cultural 
continuity. During the post election violence Kalenjin warrior groups fought to secure Kalenjin interests 
and socio-cultural persistence. Cattle related conflicts too, are often said to ensure social survival and to 
guarantee the preservation of a group’s – ethnic, age or other – social position for example by restocking 
herds after a harsh drought, by accumulating cattle for bride wealth and by establishing the reputation 
of an age set31-32-33. In short, socio-cultural factors are often advanced as the reasons for conflict as are 
socio-economic and environmental factors34. 
However, this somewhat romantic image of warrior groups as the defenders of a community does 
not necessarily represent the reality at the front lines. Colonial and post-colonial developments have 
changed the ways in which armed ethnic groups are present in the conflict. Young warriors venture out 
on their own without consent of their elders and even against them35. They are also said to have followed 
orders from and been organized and funded by prominent community members. Involvement by, for 
example politicians and state administrators and the increased prevalence of small arms in combination 
with ever more ecological variability and hardships have changed the characteristics of conflict in North 
Rift. 
As a result of these developments the action radius of warrior groups has undergone significant 
changes. The changing nature of conflict in North Rift allows for more raids to be organized along greater 
distances and stolen cattle to be sold on markets in neighbouring countries36. Numerous respondents 
recalled how, during the post election violence around Eldoret, warrior groups were transported over 
large distances37.
3.2 the Kenyan state:  administrators and politicians
Politicians and administrators are reported to have manipulated the warrior institution during the 
widespread post election violence and the protracted violent conflicts in the North Rift38. Both parties 
are known to have made strategic decisions in which they engaged warrior militias or did not adequately 
act against them. Obviously, there are no official objectives or agendas to be found regarding these 
decisions. Therefore, we will return to this issue in greater detail in our analytical chapter.
It is believed that for their cooperation warrior groups are promised political and material rewards39.
Local elites are said to engage warrior militias, increasingly organized around wage labour in large 
28 Interview with Police Officer conducted in Langas Estate, Eldoret, September 2009.
29 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu District, Rift Valley Province, September 2009. 
30 Ibid.
31 Ocan n.d., as read in Osamba, The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya, African Journal 
on Conflict Resolution, 2000, p.23.
32 Conservation Development Center, International Insitute for Sustainable Development and Saferworld, Climate Change and 
Conflict: Lessons from community conservancies in northern Kenya, 2009, p.40.
33 Krätli S. and Swift J., Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, 1999,p.18. 
34 Kimani M.J., Access-Management-Ownership: The ‘Water and Pasture Menu’ in Pastoralist Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa 
(GhoA), paper presented at: ‘Natural Resource Conflict in Africa-Is Water the New Oil?’ United Nations Conference Centre, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 – 14 November 2008, p.6.  
35 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu District, Rift Valley Province, Septermber 2009.
36 Osamba J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya, in:  African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 2000, p.25.
37 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, Rift Valley Province, August-September 2009. 
38 International Crisis Group, Kenya In Crisis, International Crisis Group, 2008.
39 Confidential Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu, Rift Valley Province, August –  September 2009. For more information see: 
Akiwumi Commission, The Akiwumi Report, Nairobi, 1999;  Human Rights Watch, Playing With Fire, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 
From Ballots to Bullets, 2008; International Crisis Group, Kenya In Crisis, , 2008;  Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 
2008
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scale and highly organized commercial raids. 
They are also thought to sell cattle on black 
markets.  There have been reports of politicians 
supposedly contracting mercenary militias to 
violate and kill alleged supporters of rivalling 
political parties and to conduct cattle raids as to 
“generate funds for electoral campaigns”40-41-42. 
High ranked politicians in North Rift are known 
to have participated in local meetings where 
they stirred up discontented communities. They 
have also facilitated and provided transport and 
other logistics for warrior militias43. Accusations 
also include acting indifferent towards large scale 
violence and raids44. 
Obviously we should look for involvement 
of administrators and officials in the those 
areas where they exert their authority. Chiefs 
and sub-chiefs can and sometimes do play a 
significant role in conflict in their respective 
administrative Location and Sub Location. District 
Commissioners can wield power mainly in their 
own administrative District and so on. The same 
goes for local politicians. High ranked politicians 
have a broader radius of action. However, they 
are most prominently active in the regions from 
which they draw political support. This often 
parallels regions with a high population of their 
‘ethnic kin’ or their region of origin. 
3.3 Kenyan security personnel 
From 2008 until the end of 2010 a number of large scale operations were undertaken in the North Rift 
Region. These took place in contexts of severe security crises or disarmament operations. Both are often 
joint operations between Army personnel, Kenyan Police and Administration Police (AP). 
In 2010 Kenyan Armed Forces numbered 24 000 of which 20 000 were Army, 1620 Navy and 2500 Air 
Forces. In this research  we focus on the Army and Paramilitary forces. The latter, named General Service 
Unit (GSU) were 5000 strong in 201045.  
Second under this title are Kenya National and Administrative Police Forces. The Kenya National 
Police reports to the commissioner of police and is a department of the Ministry of State for Provincial 
Administration and Internal Security. In 2003 Kenya National Police was about 35 000 strong. The Police 
Forces are headed by a Provincial Police Officer (PPO) in each province and further divided into divisions 
commanded by an Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) and police stations headed by an 
Officer Commanding Police Station (OCPS). The AP is another Police Force department with a separate 
hierarchy. It is headed by the Administration Police Commandant and has a presence in all provinces. 
Each is commanded by a Provincial Administration Police Commander (PAPC). The lower District 
40 Krätli S. and Swift J., Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, 1999, p.3.
41 Mathangani P., Report: How Police Killed 40 in Operation, The Standard, 09 June 2009.
42 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  Districts, Rift Valley Province, August – September 2009. 
43 Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and 
Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010.
44 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008; Osamba, J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in 
North-Western Kenya, in: African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 2000, p.3.
45 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010: The annual assessment of global military capabilities 
and defence economics., London, Routledge, 2010, pp.312-313.
Kenyatta, moi and the Box 2. 
institutionalization of violence
The political involvement in violence throughout 
Kenya has been subject to a lot of discussion. 
However, there is a wide consensus on the fact that 
violence has become a part of the country’s political 
climate since the birth of independence. The first 
president Mzee Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot 
and the stick to maintain power. Where the use of 
violence during his reign was mainly in the hands 
of the State, the army and the police his successor 
Daniel Arap Moi significantly altered this. During 
the first part of his reign Moi consolidated his power 
much like his predecessor using both draconian 
repression by security forces against his opponents 
and their grass roots and rewarding his ethnic kin. 
However, from 1990, when Moi reluctantly allowed 
multiparty elections,  political violence changed 
Political figures, administrators and others close to 
the heart of the regime reportedly organized and 
supported violent gangs and militias to kill and 
displace opposition supporters. It is suggested that 
this pattern of extra-state violence may still exist 
today. 
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Commands operate within their jurisdictions 
without directions from above save for issues of 
complaints46.
During the post elections crisis in 2008 operations 
were undertaken to safeguard the security of and 
provide relief to the communities regardless of 
their ethnic backgrounds47. Police and military 
were involved in organizing transport and security 
of internally displaced and responsible for clearing 
and protecting the main trade arteries such as 
railways and highways in the area. The official 
role of the military did not include intervention 
in cases of violence48. A few cases set aside, police 
and military conduct in the North Rift during the 
post election crisis was generally not considered 
to be problematic – in contrast to other regions.
In 2009, however, large scale disarmament 
operations throughout the North Rift caused 
controversy. In line with the 2005 – failed – 
‘Operation Dumisha Amani’ and the 2006 and 
2007 operations ‘Okota 1’ and ‘Okota 2’ Kenya security personnel executed disarmament operations 
among, for example the Samburu community of the South-Eastern region of Samburu District49. The 
operation was jointly carried out by the Kenya Army Personnel, AP, GSU and the Anti-Stock Theft Police 
Unit under the command of the PPO, Eastern Province, Mr. Jonathan Koskei50. The troops were transported 
in trucks, lorries and reportedly 3 helicopters equipped with machine guns and missiles51. During these 
operations, the security forces allegedly used excessive and indiscriminate violence against unarmed 
civilians. Accusations include lack of action, looting, rape, and  indiscriminate killings52-53-54. Research 
suggests that Kenyan security personnel are likewise involved in arming various warrior groups55. 
46 Kenyan Administration Police, Operation and  Deployment,  http://www.administrationpolice.go.ke/structure.php, 28 
February 2010
47 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008.
48 Ibid. 
49 ‘Dumisha Amani’ translates as ‘maintain peace’ it was a voluntary weapons collection aimed and strengthening security 
and promised amnesty from prosecution. No force was used. The operation, however was unsuccessful. Operation ‘Okota 
1’ succeeded operation Dumisha Amani and whas a forceful disarmament operation targeting communities that had not 
cooperated during the first phase. Operation ‘Okota 2’ was the third phase of the plan aimed at improving economic situations 
as to cope with the root causes of arms possesion.  
50 Kenya National Commission for Human Rights, Fact Finding Mission Report on the Security Operation in Samburu Carried out on 
the 23th of February 2009, 2009, p.4
51 Ibid.
52 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008.
53 Interview Police Officer conducted in Langas Estate, Eldoret, September 2009.
54 Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and 
Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.6.
55 IPIS & Transarms-Research, The Karamoja Cluster of Eastern Africa: Arms Transfers and Their Repercutions on Communal Security 
Perceptions, Antwerp – Chicago, 2010; Bevan J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Small 
Ams Survey, June 2008. 
Kenya Police reserve (KPr)Box 3. 
In an attempt to cope with the increasing insecurity 
in the region, the Kenyan Government has armed 
local defense units known as Kenya Police Reserve. 
The KPR can be depicted as a civilian militia operating 
outside central control and often indistinguishable 
from warriors or regular civilians in their appearance 
and equipment. They are mandated to respond to 
local crime and disputes. However, they are known 
to sell or hire their guns and ammunition for 
personal profit thereby facilitating the use of and 
raising the risk for violence1.  
1 Bevan, J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem 
in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 
June 2008, p.64, 66;  Leff, J. Pastoralists at War: Violence 
and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region, 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 3(2), 
2009, pp193-194
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4. analysis
An analysis of conflict and violence in the North Rift Region is an analysis of multiple actors. This diversity 
of actors, actions and roles might indeed thwart a clear account of the situation. Therefore we will focus 
on what all actors in all regions share, namely sets of motivations in which their actions are grounded. 
Within these sets we can, amongst others, distinguish between economic, (ethno)political, and identity 
related undercurrents. Despite regional differences we find these everywhere in the North Rift. 
In this chapter we discuss the motives that underlie the actions of the different parties involved in conflict 
throughout our region of interest. We will do so by focusing primarily on the actors following the levels 
of their involvement in the conflicts. This means that we first discuss armed groups and their motives 
throughout the entire region. We will thereby point out both regional similarities and differences in their 
motives. Subsequently, we will treat the involvement and motives of external parties such as politicians, 
officials and prominent community members. In a third and final paragraph we discuss the actions and 
motivations of Kenyan security personnel in Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Samburu, Laikipia and Turkana.
Destroyed shops in Burnt Forest (Photo: Jan Van den Broeck, 2009).
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4.1 armed groups in the north rift: of traditions, survival and 
ethnic cleansing 
Central in the media coverage and reports on violence in the North Rift are accounts of armed warrior 
groups affiliated to ethnic communities in the area. These armed groups can be distinguished from 
other actors by their roles in the conflict – the roles of fighters and violators –, the actions that come with 
these roles and the motivations that underpin these actions. 
In Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia districts, warrior groups performed widespread and coordinated attacks 
on a series of urban settlements and villages during the 2007-2008 post election violence which 
experienced its peak in this area. Warrior militias mostly targeted unarmed populations and security 
forces. They have been involved in petty theft as well as large scale destruction and brutal killings such 
as decapitations, burnings and mass murders56. The brutality and extent of these attacks needs to be 
emphasized (TABLE 1).
taBle 1:  the nature and extent of post election violence in uasin gishu and trans-nzoia 57-58 
uasin gishu trans-nzoia 
Fatalities (Total) 230 104
Gunshots 28 77
Sharp Objects (machetes, spears, arrows, … ) 92 21
Burns 32 3
Other crude weapons (cubs, sticks, stones, …) 78 3
Injuries 505 511
Destructions (Domestic) 52611 5210
Displaced (IDP’s) 21749 43661
Similar patterns of violence can be found in Laikipia, Samburu and Turkana. Here Turkana, Samburu, 
Pokot, Somali and other communities were (and are) involved in a broad scope of violent events. It is 
difficult to find out exactly how many incidents and confrontations take place in the area since most 
remain unreported. 
The violence to which armed groups resort is often characterized by its large scale, high lethality and 
unseen brutality. Reports are made of warrior groups resorting to indiscriminate killings, torture and 
rape. Cultural Survival reported over 50 casualties in a series of events in Samburu and neighbouring 
Isiolo District from September 2008 until December 2009. Perpetrators were armed warrior groups, 
security forces and unknown assailants59. OCHA Kenya mentions a much higher number of fatalities 
with Samburu and Isiolo both having more than 35 casualties between January and December 2009. A 
significant number of these can be attributed to a series of raids and counter raids between Borana and 
Samburu militias. According to OCHA Laikipia suffered between 5 and 35 casualties during the same 
period. This number is likely to refer to one large scale Pokot attack Samburu manyattas that took place in 
56 Confidential interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, , August-September 2009.
57 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008. 
58 Notice the high numbers of deadly casualties from crude weapons in Uasin Gishu. Also notice the discrepancy in gunshot 
fatalities between both districts. We attribute this to a difference in the spread of firearms between both districts. Most 
killings by gunshots have been ascribed to police violence. In Uasin Gishu this is most likely the case although it is very 
difficult to find clear information on the number of police killings in the district. For Trans-Nzoia   however, we do wish to 
point out that government ammunition and weapons circulate(d) among civilians in the area. Besides this, firearms were and 
are widespread due to the district’s proximity to the Ugandan border, a situations of protracted pastoral conflict along the 
borderwith West-Pokot District and the presence of the Mt. Elgon conflict and the SLDF at the time. In the course of 2008 a 
government crackdown on illegal arms in the district took place. It seems therefore unlikely that all 77 casualties by gunshots 
can be ascribed to the police. 
59 Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and 
Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.16.
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Kanampiu in Laikipia close to the Samburu 
border (BOX 4) 60-61. Again according to OCHA, 
2010 was more peaceful in the Samburu area 
with 12 confirmed deadly casualties between 
January and December62. Our respondents 
also confirmed – but did not specify – high 
numbers of displacements in the Laikipia and 
Samburu area.
As we wrote before, Turkana counts as the most 
violent district in the North Rift. At least 111 
people were killed in Turkana District in 201063. 
We found no specific numbers for 2009 but a 
map published by OCHA Kenya suggests that 
there were more than 35 fatalities in Turkana 
District between January and December 200964. 
However, these numbers are all but complete. 
The actual number of victims is no doubt much 
higher since most events remain unreported. 
The question remains as to what lies behind 
these ferocious, large scale killings. What has 
driven these people in Uasin Gishu, Samburu 
and elsewhere to commit such acts of 
violence against their neighbours? To answer 
this question we start from the recognition 
that, although conflict in the North Rift has 
changed a lot over the last decades it still still 
carries in itself the traits of traditional conflicts 
and motives that can be retraced to images 
of incompatible cultural difference.We will 
further argue that, rather than being rigid 
classifications these cultural cavities are created 
and recreated against a context of economic 
hardships, social immobility, state insufficiency 
and political  ambitions. 
the (not so) changing nature of conflict: salW’s, politics, traditional conflict and the 
Paradoxical Decline of tradition.
Confrontations and incidents in the region often appear as clear illustrations of the changing nature of 
conflict from a cultural practice sanctioned and controlled by traditional institutions into a commercial, 
international and political undertaking65.
A lot of this change can be attributed to the increased prevalence of so called ‘small arms and light 
weapons’ (SALW) in the area. Pastoral communities in the North Rift provide a excellent market for fire 
arms. Where they traditionally relied on bows, arrows, spears, pangas and rungus for protection and 
warfare they now resort to cheap and easy to use assault rifles such as the AK-47 and the G-3 rifles 
60 A manyatta is a traditional pastoralist homestead consisting of a series of huts often in a circular pattern around a cattle 
enclosure.  
61 OCHAKenya, Map Graphic; Pastoral Hotspots in Kenya by District (January – December 2009), 04 February 2010, OCHA Kenya, 32 
Die in Cattle Raid: Situation Report No.1 17.09.2009, 17 September 2010.
62 OCHA Kenya, Tracking of Killings and Displacement in Pastoral Areas: Annual Review 2010, 29 December 2010.
63 Ibid.
64 OCHA Kenya, Intensity of Pastoralist Fatalities in Kenya by District, 04 February 2010.
65 Osamba J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,in:  African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 2000, p.12
atrocities along the samburu District Box 4. 
boundaries: a short depiction of 2 case 
examples
Throughout 2009 the Samburu communities along 
the Isiolo and Laikipia border suffered a number 
of unusually large scale and violent attacks. In the 
beginning of the year a series of raids and rejoinder 
raids by Borana and Samburu armed warriors escalated 
to a full scale conflict resulting in numerous casualties 
and the loss of hundreds of cattle. During these attacks 
Borana warriors have allegedly violated men, women 
and children in an extremely cruel way raping, beating 
and killing people in their sleep, slitting their throats 
and so on. They are also said to have kidnapped 4 
children age 7, 8 and 9 on two separate occasions. 
Reportedly, all 4 of them were later found hanging 
form a tree with their throats cut and their bodies 
skinned1. 
On the 15th of September 2009 at least 400 Pokot 
raiders attacked a Samburu settlement in Kanampiu, 
Laikipia close to the Samburu border. The raid resulted 
in the dead of 21 villagers, among them 8 children 
and 3 women, and 11 Pokot attackers. Only very 
little cattle was stolen during the attack leading the 
Samburu to think that it was aimed at diminishing 
their communities or at least evicting them from their 
lands. The victims were shocked by the unusual large 
scale of the attacks and the fact that the raiders were 
so well equipped2. 
1 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of 
Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009.
2 OCHA Kenya, 32 Die in Cattle Raid: Situation Report no.1 
17.09.2009, 17 September 2009.
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which are relatively cheap due to high availability66. This can be attributed to the influx of weapons from 
neighbouring countries Uganda, (South) Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.  In addition to this, the Kenyan 
State has likewise contributed to the increased use of firearms and the consequent changes in the 
behaviour of armed groups through its security personnel and other representatives. 
Pastoral communities arm themselves for various reasons. Firstly, they need arms for protection from 
warrior groups of other communities. Firearms thus provide an excellent and easily available answer to 
Kenya’s failing security measures. Secondly, they are used for raids and conflict. Third, guns are an excellent 
investment that can be exchanged for cattle and other goods. Lastly, and this is largely entwined with 
the previous point, guns give status. Gun ownership opens doors towards power positions that were 
previously unreachable. 
The availability of SALW’s has scaled up the number of fatalities and indiscriminate killings. The 
disappearance of hand-to-hand and face-to-face fighting significantly reduced the possibility of targeting 
particular categories of people and avoiding others. This resulted in an extensive transformation of 
conflict and violence in the North Rift and the greater region of Eastern Africa. This transformation can 
be seen everywhere in the North Rift except maybe for Uasin Gishu where, as said, firearms are less 
common. Eulenberger writes that in Northern Turkana most of the raiding is done with AK47’s, G3 and 
FN rifles and that “although it is difficult to say how much brutality was already present in the era of the 
spear, it seems that the brutalization of the war that had started in other areas spread like a disease into 
the modes of of pastoralist conflict”67. The impression that raids have changed due to the increased use 
of automatic guns is supported by the people of the North Rift themselves especially when it comes 
to violence against women and children. Our sources agreed the high availability of SALW's to be one 
of the most important undercurrents of conflict in the area. They also support the claims that this is 
one of the driving powers behind the transformation conflict in the region has gone through since the 
1980's68.
The alterations in conflict patterns ask for a focus that points out actors, roles and motivations in a 
context of increasing economic and political stakes, changing ecological conditions and altered social 
needs as a rapidly changing Kenyan society increasingly penetrates into the lives of pastoralists and rural 
and urban poor. According to Krätli and Swift it is the recognition of these processes of change that has 
resulted in a categorization of internal and external causes of pastoral – and other – conflict in Kenya and 
elsewhere. With internal referring to small-scale sustainable, redistributive raiding driven by traditional 
interests and external usually associated with large scale predatory and destructive raiding driven by 
political and commercial interests. However, while the latter has become increasingly important, in 
line with these authors our research suggests that this penetration has not straight away eradicated 
the traditional undercurrents of conflict. On the contrary, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ overlap more often 
than they exclude each other69. Commercialization or politicization of raids do not exclude the influence 
of traditional symbolism. Consequently, the internal – external differentiation should not be seen as a 
dichotomous separation. Rather it is to be understood as a continuum within which all cases fall. A series 
of small-scaled traditional incidents and confrontations might trigger an escalating cycle of violent 
retaliatory attacks eventually leading to large scale highly destructive assaults that might even involve 
hired groups of mercenary raiders. External interests, be they commercial or political are most likely to 
be entwined with a pre-existent situation of insecurity. Traditional motives remain part of conflicts in 
the North Rift and the degree and impact of both traditional traits and ‘modern’ trends and tendencies 
differs from one locality to the other70. 
A clear example of this can be found in the violence that came in the wake of the 2007 general elections. 
During and after the post election violence the communities of Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia   and their 
66 Prices for AK-47 and G-3 assault rifles range anywhere between 25000 to 40000 Kenyan Shillings which is about 250 to 400 
euros. 
67 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, pp.39-40.
68 Personal Communications, April 2010 (email). 
69 Krätli S. and Swift J., Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, 1999, pp.10-11, p.23.
70 Osamba J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya, in:  African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 2000, p.13.
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armed warriors advanced several agendas other than ‘traditional’ feelings of ethno-cultural antagonism. 
The most obvious was political and related to a feeling of injustice due to the supposed rigging of the 
elections. They confronted their political adversaries as retaliation for the alleged fraud. 
Neither in Turkana nor in Samburu or Laikipia districts was this agenda so explicitly manifested. 
Nevertheless, political representation is of great importance for many pastoral communities. 
Consequently, there are connections – be it to a lesser extent – between the post election violence and 
pastoral conflicts particularly in Laikipia71. And because the Samburu were – and still are – aligned to 
another political party (ODM) than for example the Borana (PNU) this has contributed to an increase 
of tensions in and around Samburu District at times of heightened political competition72. In the 2007 
elections, Samburu and Turkana communities voted for ODP candidates, while Borana and Somali voters 
in Isiolo supported Kuti, who ran under the PNU umbrella. The 2007 election was ethnically polarized, 
and killings and thefts since then have only served to reinforce ethnic divisions. One has to keep in mind, 
however, that political alliances at the grass roots can and do change as collaborations change at the 
political top-level.
Despite its political significance, violence in the North Rift is rich in traditional connotations. During 
the post election violence Kalenjin militias in Uasin Gishu were ascribed the features and duties of 
traditional warriors. Whilst performing their raids they reportedly sung traditional Nandi warsongs. 
Elders are believed to have blessed their warriors at the advent of a violent confrontation. And in their 
discourses they expressed profound feelings of communal belonging and  responsibility. At the time 
the Kalenjin community of the North Rift was said “to be together as one to go against the bunyot73-74. 
The fraudulent elections were perceived as an attack on the community as a whole. Consequently, 
armed men claimed to defend the community by violently confronting their neighbours. They claimed 
to protect their Kalenjin kin from dangers posed by neighbouring – enemy – communities. In this they 
were driven by pervasive feelings of ethnic communality and antipathy that bring with them a series of 
culturally prescribed actions and responsibilities. 
Similar tendencies can be seen in the conflict between Samburu, Pokot and Borana. Tradition is “not alien” 
to conflict in Samburu, Laikipia and neighbouring districts75. Respondents to the KHRC mentioned how 
a traditional culture of morans and warriorship is still relevant with young men, eager to be considered 
mature and often pushed by young women to set a reputation and to generate wealth as to be able to 
marry and start a family in the future76. To do so, they rely on what has always served as a cornerstone for 
social mobility namely cattle raids. 
In all districts violence was loaded with ethnic symbolism. Male genital mutilations such as forced 
circumcision reflect deeply entrenched understandings about manhood77. In Samburu District armed 
militias cut of the hair of Samburu warriors thereby taking away one of the most important tokens of 
masculinity78. By the same token, the case of 4 abducted children found death hanging from a tree 
with their skins ripped off is sometimes believed to point towards highly ritualized modes of warfare79. 
Furthermore, rape, mass murders and decapitations reflect deeply seeded socio-cultural ideas of 
geographical belonging and interdependent images of cultural purity, contamination and danger as we 
will demonstrate later on. 
Nevertheless, simultaneously – and paradoxically – the influence of traditional precepts and institutions 
is under a lot of pressure. This translates in and is caused by a “weakening of traditional governance”  and 
“a new generation of youth that disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia 
formation”80. In this context Eulenberger mentions that the increase of SALW’s in the border regions of 
71 Personal Communication with Straight B.,  Pastoral conflict in Samburu and Laikipia, 10 April 2011, (email)
72 Personal Communication with Lesakale F., Tradition and Conflict in Samburu, 20 April 2011 (email).
73 ‘Bunyot’ is the Kiswahili word for ‘enemy’.
74 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu District, Rift Valley Province, September 2009.
75 Personal Communication with Lesakale F., Traditional and Conflict in Samburu, 20 April 2011 (email).
76 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009
77 Confidential interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu  and Trans-Nzoia   Districts,  September 2009.
78 Confidential personal communication, April 2011 (email
79 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p.18.
80 Leff J., Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region, International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence, Vol.3, No.2, 2009, p. 192, 193.
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northern Turkana, southern Sudan and Uganda eroded “the traditional authority that the elders of local 
communities used to exercise on the youth”81. Bevan too writes that “although at times warriors have 
probably always acted alone, interviews among the region’s communities point strongly to increasing 
problems associated with warriors acting outside the framework of community-sanctioned raids”82. “It 
is an age conflict too” a Kalenjin villager elder claimed. He recalled how, at a given point during the 
post election violence young men around Eldoret would turn against their elders83. The KHRC reported 
how the infamous Pokot attack of September 2009 against Samburu communities at Kanampiu near 
the Laikipia – Samburu border was conducted in disregard of the Pokot elders who had positioned 
themselves against the attacks84. By the same token, Samburu elders were very critical of the warrior 
groups that had initiated raids against the neighbouring communities, including the one that brought 
about the first security operation in the area85. All of this indicates how traditional institutions that 
used to govern conflict practices are being openly questioned, ignored and even violently opposed 
by the younger generation. Obviously, this reflects directly in the use of violence. Wholesale violent 
assaults against women, children and unarmed men and large scale coordinated attacks resulting in the 
complete destruction of residences and livelihoods can partly be attributed to the decreasing impact of 
traditional regulations on conflict in the North Rift. 
This decrease is the result of a process that includes the infiltration of a global market economy and 
neo-liberal policies on the one hand and processes of bureaucratic state building on the other. The 
former brought with it both an increasing economic polarization and new sources of wealth, social 
mobility and influence in wage labour, criminal and warlike activities or combinations of both. The latter 
is manifested in the erosion of traditional governance by – among other causes – the incorporation of 
traditional leaders in official institutions or their replacement with government officials. The process of 
incorporation, in which prominent, authoritative community members also represent state authority 
and often benefit from the privileges of this position – such as exclusive access rights to resources – has 
often brought about an increasing distrust against traditional leaders86. This is especially so when the 
profits of state presence do not trickle down to the grassroots, when social policies bear little fruit and 
peace, social security , justice and employment dividends are few.
state insufficiency and impunity
On this condition of decreasing traditional authority and state insufficiency impunity has prospered. 
Armed groups act within a pervasive culture of impunity. Situated at the heart of the post election 
violence and other conflicts this culture “has become the hallmark of violence and other crimes in 
the country”87. As a result, impunity has become normalized in the country with high level and local 
potentates as well as armed groups resorting to excessive brutalities without running the risk of being 
held accountable. This has lead to a continuous increase and further diffusion of violence. Over the 
years, violence has become a factor of daily live in every segment of Kenyan society because very little 
is done to bring justice to both victims and perpetrators. Ineffective and inappropriate government 
responses to pastoral conflicts in the area and a general state of lawlessness have turned impunity into 
an evidency making it a primary undercurrent for armed conflict. 
Members of the Samburu community reported to the KHRC how they found police laxity to be 
contributing to insecurity and violence. Police do not, or inadequately respond after being informed 
about attacks. Both Pokot and Samburu interviewees mentioned insufficient interventions by officials 
and politicians. They claim local and national governments hardly ever bring justice to the people. 
Security personnel very rarely manages to arrest and bring to court the alleged perpetrators88. This was 
81 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, p.40.
82 Bevan, J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2008, p.24.
83 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu District, Rift Valley Province, September 2009
84 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p.7.
85 Personal Communication with Fratkin E., Violence in Samburu, 28 February 2011 (email). 
86 Leff J., Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region, International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence, Vol.3, No.2, 2009, p.193; Krätli S. and Swift J., Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature 
Review, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, 1999, p.31.
87 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008, p.vii. 
88 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009.
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confirmed to us by our respondents who stated that impunity serves as one of the inducing factors for 
conflict in all pastoral areas of the North Rift with armed groups roaming freely because justice does not 
reach the grass roots and politicians are unable or unwilling  to change this situation 89. In Turkana too, 
people are asking about the “role of local authorities who seem not to show any sign of activity against 
these incidents”90.We recorded similar accounts in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia. Here, all communities 
agreed that a general state of impunity lies at the heart of the 2007-2008 post election crisis and earlier 
cases of severe conflict91. 
Several commissions and international organisations have reported on multiple cases of impunity since 
the early 1990's. However, very little is done to put the perpetrators to trial. Years of lawlessness and 
impunity have hollowed out the legitimacy of the Kenyan judicial authorities and the capabilities of 
the State to construct frameworks on which transparent courts could be erected. Consequently, armed 
groups can move freely because chances are small they will be brought to court but also because Kenyan 
Law and its representatives themselves lack legitimacy. 
Consequently,where the state fails to bring security and justice it indirectly succeeds in bringing the exact 
opposite. “State institutions do not reach the grassroots. So people feel as if there is no justice at all so 
they create their own justice”92 As we wrote, for the people of the North Rift guns are a means to provide 
security. In all districts retaliatory attacks occur to bring justice for the lives lost or the damage suffered 
in an earlier raid. These could trigger endless cycles of violence resulting in many deadly casualties. 
government neglect, hardships, competition and the urge to survive. 
Today,  despite its agricultural richness – the area is considered to be Kenya’s bread basket –, strategic 
location – on the highway that links Nairobi and Nakuru with Kisumu, Kitale and Uganda – and its 
ties with the political top-class during the Moi regime – with Moi himself being born in the region – 
unemployment and poverty in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia are  widespread and persistent.
By the same token, Kenyan authorities have created, or at least greatly contributed to the situation of 
marginalization that typifies the position of pastoral communities. Colonial and post-colonial policies 
have pushed pastoralists in the North Rift towards the socio-economic and geographical peripheries of 
Kenyan society. Job opportunities are insufficient and the struggle for survival and progress is tough93. 
Development plans largely fail to take into account the needs of the pastoral communities. This resulted 
in widespread illiteracy and chronic underdevelopment that are reinforced by recurrent, ever more 
frequent and severe periods of drought. These droughts bring about food insecurity, migration streams 
and deadly casualties. On top of this they have caused the deaths of millions of livestock thereby 
rendering livestock economy incredibly fragile94. As a consequence the material foundation of pastoral 
economy has been disrupted95.
In other words, economic and political processes and policies have not only hollowed out traditional 
morality and ruptured the social organisation of communities in the North Rift. They have likewise 
devastated the economic and material basis “on which people’s lives were hinged”96. 
Economic uncertainty due to increasing demographic and ecological pressures, government neglect and 
failing policies seems to have the biggest impact on the younger generations hence the intergenerational 
tensions we mentioned above. The despair of young men regarding their economic and physical 
situation is widely agreed to be one of the underlying causes of conflict in the North Rift97. Consequently, 
89 Personal Communication with Lesakale F, Lesorogol C., Lolwerikoi M. and Straight B. Impunity and conflict in the North Rift, 
March-April 2011.
90 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, p.51.
91 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  , August – September 2009. 
92 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu, September 2009. 
93 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, p.50.
94 Personal communication with Lesakale F., Undercurrents of pastoral conflict, 19 April 2011 (email).
95 Osamba J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,in:  African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 2000, p.14.
96 Ibid.
97 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August – September 2009. 
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some of the violence can be retraced to economic competition over various scarce resources, survival 
and opportunism98.  
In Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia young men saw in the political crisis and the chaos that followed a 
chance to grab the means that would get them through the day, a chance to profit from a situation of 
lawlessness and upheaval. Their actions reveal their urge to survive and to enrich themselves. “At first”, 
a police officer said, “the violence was spontaneous, as a cause of the political crisis but also rooted in 
poverty”99. Armed youths and bandits formed marauding gangs and took advantage of the situation to 
start stealing, robbing and looting. In the political crisis they saw a possibility to ensure their survival and 
to make material profits. This kind of violence was often depicted by a high level of spontaneity and a 
consequent lower amount of coordination. 
In other parts of the North Rift a combination of ecological hardships, socio-economic competition 
and political insufficiency resulted in a situation in which young men are easily seduced to organize 
themselves for raids against neighbouring communities and disperse them from their grazing lands 
only to ensure their own well-being and maybe even a better future. In a report of a Toposa – Turkana 
emergency peace dialogue, access to resources, grazing areas and water in combination with insufficient 
employment and hardships surfaces as a major motive for armed violence100. Also in Northern Turkana 
small groups of young warriors are often tempted to launch raids,  irrespective of the wishes of their 
community, to acquire livestock and the consequent increase in prosperity this brings101. 
These incidents and confrontations are usually typified by a smaller scale, a lower level of organisation 
and a lower number of deadly casualties. Such cases took place in Samburu District when 3 armed men 
stole 11 heads of cattle from livestock traiders on the 21st of May 2010 or when 6 Pokot raiders stole 
4 heads of cattle in Trans-Nzoia  in December 2009. In this they are very similar to acts of so called 
‘traditional’ violence. Indeed, these small scaled cattle raids are often survival strategies as much as they 
are communal and socio-cultural responses to calamities or situations of hardships. As pastoralists draw 
back on traditional systems of organisation for social mobility so do they turn towards familiar practices 
to ensure survival in times of dire need.
economic crippling in trans-nzoia and uasin gishu
Other actions are aimed at the economic destruction of immigrant or undesired communities such 
as the Kikuyu and Luhya in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia. Victims of the raids stated that the militias 
propagated that they wanted to “knock them down to their level” thereby expressing the will to 
economically cripple their victims102. In contrast to minimally coordinated and small-scaled theft and 
looting, large scale displacements and destruction of foodcrops, businesses and investments cannot 
be explained by merely referring to motivations of survival or opportunism but by to the urge to 
weaken the economic position of the Kikuyu and other immigrant communities. This urge finds its 
roots in historical, intercommunal socio-economic and land grievances. These come from feelings 
of (political and economic) marginalization by mainly the – Kikuyu headed – Kenyatta and Kibaki 
governments and perceived injustices in land allocations and resource ownership by the Kikuyu. This 
community is said to have received huge plots of land by the hand of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta shortly after 
independence. During this time they migrated en masse to Rift Valley Province to inhabit former ‘white 
farms’ on Kalenjin ancestral lands. According to the Kalenjin community these land allocations and the 
subsequent resource exploitation by immigrant communities on Kalenjin ancestral land are illegitimate 
and unjustifiable. Again, socio-cultural dispositions – regarding land and ancestry – are entwined with 
economic undercurrents of conflict and violence. 
98 Although survival and opportunism appear to be two different motives we often use them together because the violence 
that comes from these motivations reveals remarkable similarities in shape and form. Also, both are grounded in the same 
conditions of socio-economic hardships. Hence, opportunism and survival are intertwined to the extend that it is reasonable 
to say that opportunism – being the practice of taking advantage of circumstances in order to achieve rather selfish ends – 
can sometimes be considered as survival behaviour. 
99 Interview with Police Officer  conducted in Langas, Uasin Gishu District, 17 September 2009. 
100 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009.
101 Bevan, J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2008, p.24.
102 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  Districts, August – September, 2009.
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Large scale displacements, destruction and theft also occur in other parts of the North Rift. However, 
we did not come across evidence that suggests these are grounded in a desire to economically cripple 
neighbouring communities. We found nothing that suggest that Samburu, Pokot, Borana, Turkana and 
other communities want to ‘knock down’ other communities. Of course the displacement from and 
occupation of territory or the theft of livestock parallels a socio-economic relapse for the victimized 
group. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the relapse itself is the primary motivation. The grievances 
due to feelings of marginalization that underpin violence motivated by the urge to economically cripple 
the neighbouring communities in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu are much less explicit among pastoral 
communities of the North Rift. Marginalization affects most pastoralists equally. Respondents to the 
KHRC confirmed that the entire region and all its communities - Borana, Somali, Rendile, Turkana, 
Samburu and Pokot are subject to government neglect. Allegations of government favoritism exist 
but not to the extent that it leads to widespread ethnic animosities as it does in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin 
Gishu. Marginalization does surface as a motive for conflict in the discourse of the people in Samburu and 
Laikipia. But it does more so as an explanation of socio-economical hardships and inferiority compared to 
other regions than it does as a direct appeal to intercommunal grievances and images of insurmountable 
ethnic difference103. 
Commercialized (pastoral) conflict and new paths towards wealth and mobility 
Comprehensive, well organized raids leading to destruction and displacement in the ASAL regions 
of the North Rift find direct cause in the incorporation of pastoral economies in global trade systems. 
Rather than being directed at economic destruction, survival, retaliation or personal enrichment they 
are aimed at accumulation and international trade. The stolen livestock is put on the market or used to 
supply larger towns. More than in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu, conflict in the ASAL regions of the North 
Rift is highly commercialized. As the adaptation of a neo-liberal perspective since the 1980’s has resulted 
in commercial livestock economy and an orientation towards wage labour, conflict in the area came to 
reveal similar characteristics. The process of incorporation into global market economies not only brought 
about increased economic uncertainty and poverty. It also paved new paths towards socio-economic 
mobility and wealth for armed militias and the emergence of local political elites and businessmen that 
are attracted to conflict because of “economic incentives that did not previously exist”104.
Such commercial raids are typified by a higher level of organisation, better equipped militias, larger 
scale and exacerbated brutality. Whereas traditional and survival motivated small-scaled raiding does 
not deplete entire stocks, these commercialized raids with elaborate planning and logistical know-how 
can render entire communities destitute105. According to the KHRC report more than 4000 livestock 
were stolen from Samburu communities by Borana militias. Allegedly, most of the livestock was sold. 
Also, following the testimonies of the Maralal County Councillor Jeremia Leiririo to the Commission, 
commercial dimensions are equally relevant for the Kanampiu area in the conflict between Pokot and 
Samburu. The Councillor stated allegations of commercialized cattle rustling in the area should be taken 
seriously because the stolen livestock is rarely seen in the Pokot bomas’”106. Some of the cattle allegedly 
ends up at an auction at Lekuru and at Olmoran Samburu107. Others testified to the Commission how 
cows are being exchanged for 1000 Kenyan Shillings per cow in Isiolo. Some claimed cattle are taken 
to Nairobi, Darogeti and Nanyuki. Our respondents all agreed the Borana attacks of September 2009 
on Samburu communities were at least partly driven by commercial interests108. They argued that the 
sheer scale of the raids, the heavily armed militias and the fact that it showed high levels of coordination 
with hundreds of cattle being transported on trucks and lorries undeniably points towards highly 
commercialized raiding. None of them however could specify where these cattle were headed to and 
for whom they were destined. 
103 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009.
104 Leff J., Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region, International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence, Vol.3, No.2, 2009, p.193. 
105 Ibid.
106 A boma is a traditional homestead and cattle enclosure.  
107 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p.8
108 Personal communication with Straight, B., Lesakale F. & Lolwerikoi M., April 2010 (email); Telephone Interviews with Carolyn 
Lesorogol, Fred Lesakale and Michael Lolwerikoi, April 2010
23
These commercial raids are often organized around wage labour. The monetarization of the pastoral 
livestock economy brought about a ditto development of pastoral conflict in the North Rift as young 
men find in raiding activities possibilities for social, economic and political mobility that previously 
were not there. These activities appear to fill the gap that the influx of neo-liberal market policies have 
left when they ravaged through pastoral economies. Commercial raiding provides access to spoils 
and benefits that were traditionally the privilege of the elders and previously inaccessible due to poor 
economic conditions. Salaries and revenues from illegal raiding activities bring about socio-economic 
improvement but also (political) power through increased purchasing powers. With the money made 
from waged raiding men can provide for themselves and their families. It allows them to purchase 
cattle, luxury items and also guns which opens doors to prestige and power positions. As a result, the 
new opportunities that come with waged raiding are to be considered a primary motivation for armed 
conflict in the North Rift. This process has fuelled accounts of mercenary militias offering their services 
to the highest bidder. Research suggests that it is very likely that warriors from within and outside the 
different pastoral societies are “paid into service” by power figures that act as conflict entrepreneurs109.
the viable land, the land of ancestors and ethnic atrocities
In all districts land issues occupy a central position in conflicts especially since the (re)introduction of 
multi-party politics in 1991. In the contested borderlands of northern Turkana claims on land are an 
important motive for armed violence. Here incompatible claims on land are made out of economic, 
political and identity concerns relying on international agreements, legal title deeds or ancestral ties 
to the land. In land all aspects of social life culminates. From livelihoods and economics over politics, 
demography and ecology to ancestry, spirituality and religion all are, in one way or another related to 
the land. 
Firstly, people seek in land resources and material satisfaction. Consequently, if land surfaces as a 
motivation for conflict this has a lot to do with its importance as a provider of livelihoods in times of 
intense demographic, ecological and economic pressures.  In Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  warrior 
groups killed and displaced Kikuyu from their lands in order to gain access to its resources. Essentially 
than, land is to be understood as a variable – a scarce resource – in the economic competition relationship 
between neighbouring groups. This is closely entwined with feelings of socio-economic marginalization 
as is illustrated in the statement of a young Kalenjin man who said that “the Kikuyu came here and they 
took our land, they took our land and they took our resources”110.
Land as a resource is one of the possible motives behind the devastating Pokot attack at Kanampiu and 
Kirimon in September 2009. Shocked by the brutality of the attack and the fact that no livestock was 
stolen during the raid members of the Samburu community concluded that the attackers wanted to 
displace them from their lands so it would be left for the Pokot to occupy. Other sources claimed that 
the attacks could partly be explained by the desire of the Pokot to lay claim on Samburu land as to be 
able to graze their cattle on it111. In focus group interviews with Pokot women the respondents stated 
that the struggle between the Pokot and Samburu for control and ownership over grazing land is a 
major contributor to the conflict.  Members of the Turkana community also testified to the KHRC how 
they are denied opportunity to own land in economically viable areas – near roads and towns. Other 
communities – mostly Borana –  allegedly attack them in order to displace them from their land and 
occupy it themselves112. Communities in northern Turkana mentioned contestation of fertile grazing 
lands to be one of the main undercurrents of conflict between Turkana and Toposa. “This cross border 
dispute is actually an issue of grazing land along our international border113.
Secondly, people look in land for power. Occupying land in a certain region implies (political) power in 
that region. This is commonly referred to as the ‘power of numbers’ or ‘number politics’. In short, it means 
that the displacement from and occupation of land is used as a means to consolidate or extend political 
109 Osamba J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,in:  African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 2000, p.24.
110 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August-September 2009.
111 Telepone Interview IPIS with Fred Lesakale, Pastoral Conflict in Samburu District, 11 April 2011. 
112 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009.
113 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, p.31.
24
influence. Since Kenyan politics largely develop along ethnic lines with politicians drawing back on their 
ethnic kin for support and people voting for ‘one of their own’ this essentially pits ethnic communities 
against each other in a struggle for ‘politically viable’ land. This too has been forwarded as a possible 
explanation for the Pokot raids at Kanampiu and Kirimon. Our respondents stated that the targeted area 
is not teemed with resources. At the time pasture was not plenty and the area does not host any major 
water sources or rivers. Therefore they could not but conclude that besides resources, the struggle for 
enhanced political influence seems to be another, maybe more plausible motivation for armed conflict 
in the area114. These accounts also surface in the context of the confrontations in 2009 and 2010 between 
Samburu and Turkana on the one hand and Borana on the other. It is said that they were aimed at 
eliminating Samburu and Turkana presence in Eastern Samburu and neighbouring Isiolo North in order 
to expand and political power for the Borana community, or at least their political representatives115. 
These accounts find confirmation in our field research in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. Here people 
are concerned about the power that land ownership brings with it. Grounded in the widely accepted 
idea that numbers result in power Kikuyu presence on so called Kalenjin land is found to be politically 
unfavourable. Kikuyu migrations and consequent landownership in the area has lead to an significant 
number of Kikuyu on Kalenjin homelands. These Kikuyu allegedly vote for 'one of their own'. As a result 
they are able to attain political power in ‘Kalenjin territory’. Motivated by this believe armed Kalenjin 
violently turned against the Kikuyu to impede them from expanding and consolidating their power.
Against this background a motivation for sexual violence in the larger North Rift can also be found. Cases 
of rape and gang rape are omnibound throughout the region. This sexual violence is to be understood 
as attempts to socially kill the victim and thereby seriously disrupt his or her social environment. Rape 
is 'social murder', an act to undermine the social fabric of an entire community and hence a violent 
attempt to disperse them. A welcome consequence might indeed be the disruption of (perceived) 
power positions of the victimized community.     
Competition over scarce resources and the struggle for political power can provide us with insight into 
the motives that underlie some cases of displacement and killings. However, they cannot explain the 
extreme brutality and horrific character of other events. At certain occasions conflict in the North Rift 
resembled – and still resembles  –  attempts towards ethnic cleansing. To understand what motivates 
this we must again look at the issue of land. In land people of the North Rift search for meaning. “A 
Kalenjin lives by virtue of the land. You take away his land, you take away his reason to live”116. This 
way, land provides a basis for antagonizing ethnic identities. This is clearly manifested in the notions 
of madoadoa, sangara and makwekwe and the debate around majimboism that still are very common 
around Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  (BOX 5). 
The attacks on Kikuyu, Luhya and other communities in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  are not merely 
politically and economically motivated. They are identity or ethnic conflicts too. They originate from 
historical grievances and intimate cultural understandings such as makwekwe and madoadoa that draw 
distinct and insurmountable boundaries between communities.  In this the Kalenjin perceive Kikuyu 
and Luhya presence on what they consider to be their ancestral lands not only as economically and 
politically detrimental, illegitimate and unjust but also as a profound threat to Kalenjin socio-cultural 
persistence. These notions allow the Kalenjin and other communities to translate economic and political 
hardships, competition and struggle into conflict revolving around incompatible ethnic identities. They 
are part of a collective memory that is constructed around a fundamental we-versus-they duality. They 
are the discursive recontextualisation and reinterpretation of violent histories in order to disambiguate 
social realities and create clear boundaries between friends and foes. They also allow for a degradation 
and dehumanization of the opponent.  
This process starts with the depiction of the adversary as an enemy. This not only allows for a far reaching 
social juxtaposition but also for ascriptions of everything that is believed to be bad, unclean, unjust and 
immoral. The enemy essentially embodies everything that you are not. He is a thieve or a lazy idler, a land 
114 Telephone Interview IPIS with Fred Lesakale, Pastoral Conflict in Samburu District, 11 April 2011; Telephone Interview IPIS with 
Carolyn Lesorogol, Pastoral Conflict in Samburu District, 08 April 2011.
115 Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and 
Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010.
116 Interview conducted in Kesses, 05 September 2009.
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grabbing immigrant, a violator, a criminal and so forth. Our research reveals the use of these everywhere 
across the North Rift. The description of the adversary as the enemy or as a murderer – Samburu 
sometimes depict the Pokot as child-murderers – a thieve and so on is common in all regions. They even 
the path towards a further degradation, for example when Kalenjin refer to Kikuyu as madoadoa. In and 
around Samburu District the Pokot are referred to as ‘wild bushpeople’ while the Borana are alleged to 
refer to Samburu as ‘beasts’117. They reduce the adversaries to lesser persons and even inhuman entities. 
This paves the way towards violent extremities that cannot be explained by reference to economic and 
political considerations or social and material necessities but that need to be understood as cultural 
expressions of the most fundamental kind. They reveal a kind of violence that is meaningful beyond its 
political or economic instrumentality and linked to pervasive cultural values. Their usage explains why 
conflict in the North Rift, despite the fact that it is absorbed by neo-liberal and (post)modern processes 
and has consequently undergone great changes remains hinged on tradition for its legitimation and 
appearance. Here too, external actors play an important role for it is in the interplay between material, 
social and structural conditions and political discourse that ideas of insurmountable difference surface. 
117 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  , August-September 2009, Telephone Interviews Lesakale F, Lesorogol 
C., Lolwerikoi M. and Straight B., April 2011. 
Deadly agendas and murdering cultural understandings: a note on ‘majimboism’, Box 5. 
‘madoadoa’ and ‘makwekwe’  
In Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia immigrant communities are commonly referred to as madoadoa or makwekwe 
and less frequently sangara with the additional notation that they need to be removed or uprooted1.  These 
notions frequently appear together with that of majimboism. This is firstly a political agenda and secondly a 
highly cultural motivational mindset that reverberated widely among the warrior groups.
Majimboism translates as ‘federalism’ or ‘devolution’. It is used to refer to a system of regional or provincial 
autonomy and is mostly supported by the Kalenjin and a number of other, smaller communities. The main 
reason of support for this agenda is the believe that majimboism will lead to a more just redistribution of 
the ‘national cake’ or the nation’s resources. Implementation of majimboism implies exclusive control over 
resources and incomes generated in a certain region. It is therefore a strong protest and counter movement 
against policies of centralized accumulation and redistribution. 
The majimboism debate has proven to be very divisive since it not only appeals to issues of economic and 
political well-being but also to feelings marginalization,injustice, geographical belonging (hence land) and 
ethnicity. It has been negatively associated with dispersing immigrant communities  – people traditionally 
considered to come from another jimbo – and even ethnic cleansing in order to reclaim ancestral lands, 
resources and jobs. A lot of the violence that occurred around the 1992 and 1997 election violence was 
committed under the guise of majimboism. 
Often closely related to majimboism are the notions of madoadoa, makwekwe and sangara. Madoadoa 
translates as ‘spots’. Makwekwe and sangara are both Kiswahili terms referring to ‘weeds’ or ‘wild grasses’. 
All are highly derogatory terms with deep cultural connotations signifying impurity and contamination. 
Therefore, they are inevitably related to notions of removal and cleansing. Uprooting makwekwe or weeds 
symbolizes the removal of a community by taking away its roots or all that assures its growth and persistence. 
These understandings are clearly reflected in the violence that took place in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia 2.
1 Interview conducted in Kesses, 05 September 2009.
2 For a more detailed study of these notions and their implications see:  Van den Broeck, J., “It’s how they do their politics” 
The Roots and Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict around the Kenyan Town of Eldoret. Leuven, Catholic University of Leuven, 
2010 
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4.2. “the politics of self-centeredness” and the commerce 
of conflict: ‘external’ complicity of politicians, officials, and 
prominent community members 
“They practice a politics of self-centeredness. They incite people against each other for their own benefits. 
They eat alone or share with the enemy but not with their people. They consider the lives lost in the violent 
conflict as collateral damage”118.  
These words depict in a striking manner how people feel about the involvement of politicians and officials 
in conflicts throughout the North Rift. In Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia both are widely reported to have 
been involved in the conflicts directly and indirectly as facilitators, instigators and organizers. By the 
same token the people of Samburu, Laikipia and Turkana point towards politicians and administrators 
as significant driving forces behind pastoral conflicts in the region.  
“Between two fires”:  the complicity of chiefs  
The Waki Commission reports cases of chiefs who “were not there for the people” and “not helpful”. In his 
testimony to the Waki Commission the District Commissioner for Uasin Gishu, Bernard Kinyua admitted 
having received information that some of his chiefs did not help their populations119. This was confirmed 
to us by a chief in Cheptiret and one in Kesses, Uasin Gishu District. Both stated how some chiefs did 
little to stop the violence in their locations120. They also stated that they had difficulties in maintaining 
their position as a government official. The chief in Cheptiret told how he was caught up “between two 
fires”, how he had left his location when the violence started and how he returned when all had ended 
thereby indirectly facilitating violent attacks in his area the area under his authority of authority121. The 
Waki Report also reveals cases of chiefs actively inciting people and participating in the violence in for 
example Burnt Forest and Kiambaa122. We received similar testimonies from IDP’s from the same two 
villages and Eldoret, Kitale, Munyaka, Langas and Yamumbi123. The statement of the Chief in Cheptiret 
reveals a lot about the motivations underpinning his actions and  those of his colleagues. In saying that 
he was “between two fires” he referred to the fact that he was both a government official with specific 
responsibilities and a respected member of an ethnic community that was at war. In the end, he chose 
not to stand up against the violence committed by armed members of his community. This demonstrates 
that ethnic affiliation can have a strong impact on these kinds of feelings and behaviour.
In Samburu and Laikipia the reaction of the chiefs and other local duty bearers in response to the 
increased insecurity in the area was found to be inadequate124.  Like the chief in Cheptiret some chiefs in 
Samburu, Laikipia, Turkana and other neighbouring regions are believed to have facilitated the violence 
in a number of ways. “It happens already at the level of the chief”125. Such allegations are supported by 
Krätli and Swift who write that chiefs might take up the role of facilitator or promoter of armed raids 
as to be able to receive a share of the booty or as a way to assure themselves and their immediate 
surroundings of access to certain resources126. Bevan concludes that ammunition often reaches armed 
Turkana raiders through the chiefs127. Kamenju writes how chiefs would not reveal gun possession to 
higher authorities out of loyalty to their respective communities128. Here too, responsibilities regarding the 
ethnic community are believed to have prevailed over their duties as a state official. Local administrators 
118 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu, September 2009. 
119 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008.
120 Interviews conducted in Kiambaa and Burnt Forest, August – September 2009.
121 Interview Chief Cheptiret conducted in Cheptiret, 08 September 2009.
122 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008, pp.56-57.
123 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia   Districts, August-September 2009.
124 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p17.
125 Confidential telephone interview IPIS, April 2011 
126 Krätli, S. and Swift, J., Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, 1999, p.3, 6. 
127 Bevan, J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2008, p.49.
128 Kamenju, J., Terrorized Citizens; Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya, Security Research and 
Information Centre, Nairobi, 2003, p.87.
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often rely on ethnic membership as a primary legitimation for authority. Some sources claim that chiefs 
are “under control” themselves or that higher authorities try to undermine their positions129.  
“the politics of self-centeredness”: politicians and high ranked officials as organizers, 
financiers, facilitators and instigators.
We already wrote how during the post 
election violence  local and high ranked 
politicians reportedly  participated in 
meetings where issues of organisation 
were discussed and where they incited the 
communities and instigated the attacks. A 
village elder in Cheptiret recalled how at 
one such meeting a top Kalenjin politician, 
Member of Parliament for Eldoret North 
Constituency and member of the so 
called Pentagon came to speech130-
131-132. Comparable situations are also 
documented by the Waki Commission, 
the KNCHR, the OHCHR and others in 
their investigation into the post election 
violence in the North Rift Region133. The 
International Criminal Court prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo confirmed these 
findings after his investigation and has 
named and presented cases against 6 
people that are to appear in The Hague 
(BOX 6) . 
Addressing the increased raiding and 
counter raiding between Toposa and 
Turkana participants at a peace dialogue 
late 2009 said that there were plenty of 
accusations and counter-accusations 
that leaders and elite from both sides 
were involved134. The volatile socio-
economic positions of young men made 
them an easy and structurally available 
prey for prominent individuals and local 
potentates in their attempts to organize 
warrior militias135.  
To succeed in these attempts high ranked 
individuals reportedly paid the groups 
129 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p17.
130 Although the man did not name him explicitly the politician he refers to is William Ruto. 
131 The Pentagon is a group of 5 prominent ODM politicians namely William Ruto, Najib Balala, Charity Ngilu, Musalia Mudavadi 
and Joseph Nyagah. Of these, only Ruto is a Kalenjin, the others are respectively Swahili, Kamba, Luhya and Embu. it is clear 
that, although he did not mention his name according to this Village Elder it was William Ruto who was participating in this 
meeting. 
132 Interview Nandi Village Elder conducted in Cheptiret, 8 September 2009.
133 See: Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the 
Precipice; A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence, 15 August 2008, p.68; International Crisis Group, Kenya 
In Crisis, 2008; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report from the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya 6-28 
February 2008, 2008.
134 Eulenberger, I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, p.21.
135 Osamba J.O., The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,in:  African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 2000, p.25.
the “ocampo six” and their ChargesBox 6. 
The case of the Prosecutor vs. William Ruto, Henry Kosgey 
and Joshua Arap Sang.
On the counts of murder, forcible transfer of population, torture 
and persecution constituting a crime against humanity:
William Samoei Ruto:•	  Minister of Higher Education, 
Science and Technology  (suspended), MP for Eldoret 
North and during the post election violence, MP for 
Eldoret  North (Uasin Gishu). 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey: •	 Minister of Industrialization, 
MP for Tinderet Constituency, ODM  Chairman and 
during the post election violence: MP for Tinderet 
(Nandi District). 
Joshua Arap Sang:•	   Head of Operations, KASS FM 
(Eldoret) and during the post election  violence: 
Radio broadcaster. 
The case of the Prosecutor vs. Francis Muthuara, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, Mohamed Husein Ali.
On the counts of murder, forcible transfer of population, rape 
and other forms of sexual violence and other inhumane acts 
constituting a crime against humanity: 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura: •	 During the post election 
violence and to date: Head of the Public Service and  
Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the National 
Security Advisory Committee.
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta: •	 Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance.
Mohamed Hussein Ali:•	  Chief Executive of the Postal 
Corporation of Kenya and during the post election 
violence he was Commissioner of the Kenya Police.
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into service by rewarding them financially or materially thereby introducing them into the conflict as 
mercenaries136. Warrior groups were  promised money and rewards to commit violence against Kikuyu 
communities in Uasin Gishu. We received reports of prominent Kalenjin businessmen and politicians 
funding and orchestrating the attacks. A Kalenjin village elder gave detailed accounts of meetings 
where elders,  Kalenjin officials and politicians such as MP William Ruto came to speak, how Kalenjin 
businessmen and top athletes financed the raids and took care of the necessary supplies and transport 
and so on137.“They were promised 200 bob per day to do damage” a Kikuyu woman in an IDP camp near 
Burnt Forest testified138. The Waki Report depicts similar testimonies claiming that Kalenjin warriors were 
promised a 1000 Kshs for every house they raided139. 
In other parts of the North Rift, the commercialization of conflict resulted in large scale waged raids. 
Our sources confirmed the existence of these commercial raids and agreed that the Borana attacks 
on Samburu communities at the eastern border of Samburu district in 2009 might be a case example. 
They pointed towards “large players”, businessmen, companies and politicians of all communities as the 
driving forces behind these raids140. 
Respondents to the KHRC and members of Samburu communities in the Archers Post area pointed out 
the Kenyan Meat Commission (KMC) as the main buyer of the stolen cattle. They also mentioned other 
buyers, mainly local butcheries and hotels in Isiolo and Meru that allegedly collaborate with Borana 
raiders with the help of politicians and local administration. Cows are reportedly being traded for 
anything between 1000 and 5000 Shillings in Isiolo, Nairobi and elsewhere. They also transported to 
and traded in neighbouring countries Uganda, (South)Sudan – where they are sold for 1000 dollars per 
head of cattle – and Tanzania. The raiders themselves are thought to keep part of the profit or receive 
payments in advance141.
According to these testimonies, the KMC, the butcheries and hotels “place orders for animals through 
the Provincial Police Officers (PPO) of Embu and Nakuru”142-143. Other respondents to the Commission 
also mentioned a “PPO who is a Nandi and was based in Embu but has since been transferred” hereby 
referring to Jonathan Koskei. They also mention the names of the (former) Province Commissioner for 
Rift Valley, Hassan Noor, the Minister of Livestock and current Member of Parliament for Isiolo North 
Constituency, Mohammed Abdi Kuti and his predecessor Moku. All of them are allegedly involved in 
organizing, facilitating and financing commercial raids144.  
However, the motives behind the actions of these facilitators and organizers are not confined to mere 
commercial interests. “Commerce might be one motive but there are political interests involved as 
well”145. Both often go hand in hand. “Politicians and parties have to extend their areas of control and 
this goes together with resources and wealth”146. As Cultural Survival writes “most people in the area 
attribute the increase in violence to interference by politicians”147. One of the main reasons why people 
suspect political complicity in, for example the conflicts between Samburu, Borana and Pokot is the 
large scale of the attacks and the armed militias involved in them. The fact that groups of more than 
400 armed Pokot warriors could move freely through the area made people assume that some political 
coordination was behind it. Rumours of politicians going as far as to organize raids in order to fund 
political campaigns are widely believed in Samburu and adjacent regions. Our informants claimed that, 
136 Interviews conduted in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia   Districts, August – September 2010.
137 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu, September 2009. 
138 Confidential interview conducted in Uasin Gishu, September 2009.
139 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008, p.85.
140 Personnal Communication, IPIS, March-April 2011 (email)
141 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009. 
142 Prior to June 2009 the PPO for Embu was Jonathan Koskei, he was later replaced by Marcus Ochola. In Nakuru Henry Ashimalla 
served as PPO before June 2009, after June 2009 Francis Munyambu was appointed this position. 
143 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p.12
144 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009.
145 Confidential Telephone Interview IPIS, April 2011. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and 
Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.17. 
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in order to uncover political complicity in violence along the Samburu – Isiolo border and the Samburu 
– Laikipia border  one “must look at the level of the MP’s”148.   
In this context the name of MP and Minister of Livestock Mohammed Kuti keeps returning. According 
to the KHRC report Kuti played a big role in the facilitation and organisation of the Borana raids. He is 
supposed to have facilitated the alleged transfer of stolen cattle to the KMC and the Dagoretti slaughter 
house. The MP for North Isiolo is likewise accused of inciting violence against the Samburu and Turkana 
in order to drive them away from their lands and in doing so extend and consolidate his political 
influence149. Some sources claim that in June and July 2009 Kuti openly bragged about hiring and 
funding the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to displace Samburu and Turkana and attack communities 
in Samburu District. They also stated Kuti housed the OLF for about 60 days. Allegedly the mercenaries 
have been involved in a number of incidents over during this time150. 
In another case, Kuti is believed to have played a big role in arming Borana and Somali communities. In 
their testimonies they claimed that Kuti supplied 780 guns – the official number is 300 – to the Borana 
communities151.  The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (not to be confused with the KHRC) 
wrote that “insecurity was further fuelled by the legalization of firearms, issued by the Government 
through the local Police”. This allegedly happened after “on the 26th of January 2009, Isiolo North Member 
of Parliament and the District Commissioner (Mr. Waweru Kimani) led a delegation to the office of the 
President to request him to allow 300 guns to be given to the community following the perceived rise 
of insecurity. Their request was granted and the guns were distributed among the inhabitants of Isiolo. 
The distribution exercise was conducted by the police”.152 Cultural Survival gives a somewhat different 
account of these events. “In February 2009, the government permitted the Isiolo Member of Parliament, 
Mohamed Kuti, to distribute 300 guns to tribes (Borana and Somali) that support his political party” 
(PNU). “These tribes are traditional enemies of the Samburu and Turkana, who generally support the 
opposition party (ODM). Arming them was widely viewed and condemned by local potentates and 
businessmen as a move to favor his political supporters and as inciting violence against the Samburu 
and Turkana.153” Our informants support these findings and claims that the reason for this distribution of 
guns was not necessarily and directly aimed at the  incitement of violence against Turkana and Samburu 
people – although he admits this might very well be an anticipated side effect – but a form of political 
patronism154. Kuti, for his part, accuses other politicians – whom he does not name – of doing the same 
thing and he points towards the Minister of Internal Security, Saitoti for protecting the Samburu through 
inaction. In a news briefing in November 2009 he accused Saitoti of focusing on the 2012 elections and 
not on protecting the “lives of citizens under his docket”. He continued saying that Saitoti should be 
“ejected from the office to save lives”, that “this is politically motivated ethnic cleansing” and that “Saitoti 
is squarely to blame for all this”155.  
Notwithstanding some very convincing cases against them, the roles of politicians as financiers or 
organizers violence remains highly contested. Ruto, Kosgey and Kenyatta are yet to be proven guilty 
of the accusations against them. Allegations against Kuti are challenged by a group of researchers who 
claim that the information is inaccurate. They state that the complicity of the OLF in a series of attacks 
along the Eastern Samburu border is highly unlikely156. Although rumours of political involvement in 
pastoral conflict are often thought to be true we rarely come across evidence that irrefutably confirms 
them. Those who point towards political complicity often fail to come up with names. Consequently, we 
are inclined to emphasize that these allegations need to be treated with caution. Politicians and other 
prominent figures cannot solely be held responsible for the situation of protracted insecurity in the 
148 Confidential Telephone Interviews IPIS,  March – April 2011.
149 Confidential Telephone Interviews IPIS,  March – April 2011; Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An 
Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.17. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p11.
152 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Fact-Finding Mission Report on the Security Operation in Samburu Carried Out 
on the 23rd of February  2009, p.3.
153 Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and 
Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.15. 
154 Personal Communication with Lesakale F, April 2010 (email)
155 Ramadahan Rajab and Ali Abdi, “10 Killed, Six Injured As Raiders Attack Village,” East African, Standard, 16 November 2009. 
156 Personal communication with Lesorogol C., April 2011 (email). 
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North Rift. Communities are known to engage warrior groups and mercenary militias in times of conflict 
thereby contributing to prolonged cycles of violence regardless of any political interference. As we 
argued, armed groups venture out on their own without being contracted, without an encompassing 
plan, regardless of any political agenda. 
Summarized we can say that the issue of external complicity is highly contested. The extend to which 
political interference influences the course and outcome of conflict is uncertain and sometimes 
exaggerated. However, testimonies and reports of such interference are recurrent and persistent. 
Therefore they demand further investigation. 
What is less contested is the fact that politicians do incite people against each other and foment ethnic 
violence. For this they rely on the ability to mobilize through actions that not only promise material or 
financial improvement but that simultaneously appeal to ethnic identities and emotions. Indeed, the 
promise of material rewards and land to a Kalenjin is never solely a promise of a better material future. 
It is also an appeal to antagonizing ethnic identities that are the result of a process in which social, 
economic and other issues are being politically ethnicized. Affiliations and antagonisms are continuously 
reinforced and ethnic fissures recreated in an interplay between structural circumstances, collective 
memories of marginalization and political conduct emphasizing ethnicity. The legacy of almost two 
decades of ethno-political violence and antagonizing political behaviour has lead to a series of ethnic 
discrepancies that can easily be manipulated and highlighted to the extent that images are created and 
maintained that they can only be negotiated through violence. One such image is clearly reflected in 
discourses on madoadoa, makwekwe and majimboism or discourses about beasts, wild bush people 
and so on. 
Kalenjin politicians such as William Ruto and Henry Kosgey and prominent community members such 
as Kass FM radio broadcaster Joshua Arap Sang are said to have highlighted ethnic fissures and incited 
Kalenjin communities against others by emphasizing, amongst other things feelings of marginalization 
and the need for majimboim. As we demonstrated, this agenda was highly antagonizing because of its 
reference to historical grievances and land issues. By constructing a campaign around land and resource 
related issues they turned towards the extremes of identity politics. By using notions such as madoadoa 
they transformed political agendas into images of insurmountable difference. Their reference to 
understandings of purity and danger (madoadoa and sangara) in political discourses created, reaffirmed 
and deepened ethnic cavities. In doing so, they likewise created and reaffirmed ethnic images of cause 
and guilt related to social, economic and judiciary issues and grievances with the Kalenjin communities 
in which the Kikuyu occupied a central position. Thereby they paved the way towards large scale ethnic 
atrocities throughout Trans-Nzoia  and Uasin Gishu. 
The same conclusions can be made about political behaviour in other regions of the North Rift. Our 
respondents agreed that mobilization of pastoral communities in Samburu, Turkana and Laikipia is based 
on politically highlighted ethnic identities. Eulenberger depicts populism as one of the conspicuous 
factors of conflict in northern Turkana and adjacent borderlands. With populism he points towards 
attempts of to gain political influence by using rhetoric and measures that aim at taking advantage 
of emotions, desires and sensitivities of that population, often directed against a rival group157. Other 
sources mentioned how they witnessed politicians riling up people and drawing pastoralists into 
political campaigns on multiple occasions and  would refer to communities that traditionally do not 
support them as ‘thieves’, ‘beasts’, ‘bushmen’ and so on158. 
A first background to this political interference and incitement is found in the ethnicized character of 
Kenyan politics. Politicians draw support from their ethnic kin or region of origin and people often vote 
for one of their own. This is rooted in the deeply entrenched disposition that ethnic representation at 
the political top will make way for political power and a more favourable distribution of the ‘national 
cake’. Consequently, political competition and eventually conflict will always unfold alongside ethnic 
boundaries regardless of changes that take place in ethnic alliances at the political top. It seems that 
the Kalenjin political elite understood very well that the key to success therefore was in constructing 
a (political) discourse that offers explanations and solutions for day-to-day hardships and concerns 
157 Eulenberger I., Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya: 
At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st oktober to 1st November 2009, 2009, p.7.
158 Confidential telephone interviews, IPIS, April 2011. 
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soaked with fundamental ethno-cultural understandings of difference and likeness. In doing so they not 
only presented themselves as the ambassadors of a community but as the personification of communal 
sores, stakes and solutions. 
However, it is believed that this not necessarily an act of community based on ethnic motivations. 
“Ethnicity is something for the people, not for the ones at the top. They do not care about ethnicity, 
they share an ideology”159. This ideology was beautifully depicted by a Kalenjin man as “the politics of 
self-centeredness” thereby joining the position of all our respondents regardless of their ethnic origin160. 
They claim that prominent politicians are motivated by political and economic interests and professional 
ambition. This believe seems to be rooted in the fact that in the North Rift the relationship on which 
redistribution is supposed to depend is highly unequal and hierarchical161. In other words, a growing 
group of urban and rural poor increasingly questions the motives of their political elite who do not 
manage to deliver the pieces of the national cake they promise. 
Both politicians and officials could only succeed in their enterprises because they knew very little would 
be undertaken to stop them or to penalize them. They too act within a culture of impunity. Very little 
has been done to enhance their accountability for the 1992, 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007-2008 cases of 
political violence. Very little suggests that the Kenyan government has investigated and prosecuted 
those responsible for the previous rounds of electoral violence. Our informants mentioned on multiple 
occasions how leading figures involved in previous rounds of violence were again concerned in the 
2007-2008 post election violence162. And until today Kenya has not succeeded in establishing a national 
tribunal to adjudicate the key players of the latest post election violence neither on a high, mid or lower 
level. The communities of the North Rift believe that “the culture of impunity has been encouraged 
among these leaders such that they engage in crime without fear of repercussions”163.  Again, such 
allegations lack sufficient prove. Therefore, more investigation remains necessary.  
4.3. state coordinated violence: disarmament and excessive 
security operations  in the north rift
Our field research into the post election violence revealed how both Police Forces and Military were 
directly involved in the conflict as fighters and facilitators. It is widely agreed that the official objectives 
of the security operations do not match the actual motives underpinning the excessively violent 
conduct of security personnel. Reports on excessive police violence during security and disarmament 
operations in other parts of the North Rift suggest the same. Our informants mentioned cases of police 
and other security forces being hard handed and resorting to excessive violence and brutality. Other 
accusations included them not coming to the assistance of individuals and communities under attack164. 
Kenyan security personnel are also accused of supplying weapons and ammunition to pastoralists, for 
example to secure areas from trans-border raids”165. This information is supported by recent research that 
describes how not only Kenya Police Reserves but also Administration Police and Kenya Police distribute 
ammunition to various warrior groups in Turkana District. The Small Arms Survey suggests that “Kenya 
Police supplies almost 50 per cent of the ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North”166. 
A police officer in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu told how police and security forces would ignore cries for help 
of Kikuyu under attack while taunting the victims with President Kibaki’s slogan “kazi iendelee” (let the 
159 Interview conducted in Kesses, Uasin Gishu District, 24 August 2009.
160 Interview conducted in Kitale, Trans-Nzoia  District, 13 September 2009.
161 Kimani M.J., Access-Management-Ownership: The ‘Water and Pasture Menu’ in Pastoralist Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa 
(GhoA), paper presented at: ‘Natural Resource Conflict in Africa-Is Water the New Oil?’ United Nations Conference Centre, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 – 14 November 2008, p.7. 
162 Confidential interviews conducted in Trans-Nzoia   and Uasin Gishu, August – September 2009.
163 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Bring of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 
Election Violence, 15 August 2008, p.93. 
164 Confidential interviews conducted in Trans-Nzoia   and Uasin Gishu, August – September 2009; Personnal Communication, 
IPIS, March – April 2011 (email). 
165 IPIS & Transarms-Research, The Karamoja Cluster of Eastern Africa: Arms Transfers and Their Repercutions on Communal Security 
Perceptions, Antwerp – Chicago, 2010
166 Bevan J. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Small Ams Survey, June 2008, pp.17-18
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work continue)167. This was 
also reported by the Waki 
Commission168. The officer 
recalled how sometimes police 
would work together with the 
marauding gangs169. Similar 
accounts can be read in the Waki 
report that cites a witness saying 
that “the Kalenjin officers in the 
camp joined their kinsmen in 
the attacks”170. By the same token 
police and paramilitary personnel 
are said to have teamed up with 
armed militias in Samburu. Several 
testimonies mention how people 
saw the cattle stolen by Borana 
militias being loaded on GSU and 
Police trucks and lorries171. 
In the far North of the region 
“the overall situation is creating 
a strong symbiosis between the 
security forces and their armed civilian neighbours” as well. Here, one of the most interesting stories 
we came across was that of a local police post in the Elemi triangle that was attacked by a small Toposa 
squad at 9 in the morning on the 22nd of April 2009. That morning the commanding officer was  brushing 
his teeth when the raiders caught him by surprise and shot him in the arm. He then retreated and the 
raiders went away with the three donkeys of the police station. While the officer was brought to the 
government hospital in Nairobi for treatment, the Turkana locals hunted down the raiders, recovered the 
donkeys and brought them back. After a couple of days, on 28th April, the story repeated itself in almost 
the same way. The Toposa attacked, the officer got shot, the donkeys stolen and the raiders pursued by 
Turkana warrior after which they returned the donkeys172.
Multiple cases of excessive brutality such as raping, beating unarmed civilians and engaging in extra 
judicial indiscriminate killings by Police Forces have also been reported173. According to the Waki 
Commission the army personnel deployed in the region for humanitarian purposes and to reinstall 
security during and after the post election violence generally received good reports. However, we also 
received testimonies of army personnel being indifferent and engaging in disproportionate violence174. 
This kind of  brutality is merely one example of a returning pattern of behaviour that seems endemic for 
security operations throughout the country. During our period of interest several large scale operations 
were conducted in other parts of the country as well. Two very illustrative cases are the crackdown on 
the Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF) and the disarmament operations in the Mandera Triangle. Both 
167 Interview with Police Officer conducted in Langas Estate, Eldoret, September 2009
168 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008, p.55.
169 Confidential interview conducted in Langas, Uasin Gishu District, 17-09-2009
170 Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008, p.55.
171 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009.
172 Personal communication with Eulenberger I., 23 March 2011 (email).
173 See for example: Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, The Cry of 
Blood: Report on Extra-Judicial Killings and Disappearances, 2008; Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Mission To Kenya, United Nations Human Rights Council, 26 May 2009; Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report from the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya 6-28 February 2008, 2008.
174 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August – September 2009. See also: Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 
2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, The Cry of Blood: Report on Extra-Judicial Killings and Disappearances, 
2008; Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Mission To Kenya, United 
Nations Human Rights Council, 26 May 2009.
Police helicopter landing during security operation in Samburu. 
(Photo: Tina Ramme, 2009).
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revealed similar patterns of action with security forces rounding up people, torturing, raping, beating 
and killing175. 
Other case examples in this context are the joint Army and Police operations in and around Samburu 
district in 2009 and 2010. Officially these operations were aimed at disarmament of the conflicting 
communities and the confiscation and redistribution of stolen cattle to their rightful owners in order to 
restore security in a violence-torn region. On the 23th of February 2009, shortly after violence between the 
Borana and Samburu had escalated, a security operation in Samburu East, Waso Division was launched. 
This security swoop included joint military, paramilitary and police forces in an operation to mop out 
illegal guns and recover cattle supposedly stolen by Samburu. 
The operation was carried out by an estimated 600 police and paramilitary personnel such as the GSU 
who were dispatched from Archers Post and arrived in about 20 lorries and 3 helicopters. It left most 
people traumatized as security personnel severely beat the villagers, ransacked the homesteads and 
sprayed bullets haphazardly from helicopters. Police confiscated more than 4000 heads of cattle and 
redistributed them hastily and fraudulently at the Isiolo Airstrip. None of the cattle were returned. This 
has caused an enormous impact on the livelihoods of the people of Leratta. On the 24th of February 
similar operations took place in Naishamunye and Laresoro where about a 1000 security personnel 
came in with choppers and lorries, stole cell phones, money and other properties and beat men, women 
and children. Following a report of the KNHCR two morans later identified as a Lenaiyasa and Leamaran 
were killed during the attack. Opinions differ on this case since the Cultural Survival report on security 
operations in Samburu only mentions the death of the former176. 
Similar operations took place in the aftermath of the Pokot attacks in September 2009 similar 
operations took place. All of these were excessively violent. Witnesses testified how the military and 
police indiscriminately fired down from helicopters on the villagers while ground troops carried out 
their attacks. Security forces are also said to have severely beaten community members with cubs and 
machetes and raped several women177. According to a credible source, Kenyan Police were permanently 
stationed in the area near Archers Post from June until September 2010. During this time human rights 
violations continued on a smaller scale and with a reduced intensity178.
The Kenyan media has also written that on both occasions bombs, mortars and even yet-to-be-identified 
chemicals have been used179. The use of chemicals and bombs we believe to be very unlikely.  However, 
based on various testimonies , a consultation of ‘The Military Balance’ publication by The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) and pictures published in the Cultural Survival report we can conclude 
that the helicopters used in the operation were Army material of the Hughes 500MD Scout Defender 
type possibly equipped with TOW missiles180. This could explain references to the use of bombs and 
explosives. 
We were also told that the permanent presence of security forces marked the beginning of a police 
operation named ‘Walk and Shoot’. By the same token, Mohamed Kuti allegedly threatened the Samburu 
community with security operations ‘Walk and Shoot’ and later ‘Prepare for Doom’181.  However, we have 
175 For more information on these cases see: Human Rights Watch, “All the Men Have Gone”: Ware Crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon 
Conflict, Human Rights Watch, 2008; Human Rights Watch, “Bring the Gun or You’ll Die”: Torture, Rape and Other Serious Human 
Rights Violations by the Kenyan Security Forces in the Mandera Triangle,  Human Rights Watch, 2009; Philip Alston, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Mission to Kenya, United Nations Human Rights Council, 
26 May 2009.
176 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Fact-Finding Mission Report on the Security Operation in Samburu Carried Out 
on the 23rd of February 2009, 2009, p.5.; Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation of Human Rights 
Violations by Police In Samburu East and Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.22.
177 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Fact-Finding Mission Report on the Security Operation in Samburu Carried Out on 
the 23rd of February 2009, 2009; Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 
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179 Mathangani, P., Report: How Police Killed 40 in Operation, The Standard, 09-06-2009. 
180 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010: The annual assessment of global military 
capabilities and defence economics., London, Routledge, 2010, pp.312-313.
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not found any evidence that confirms the existence of these security operations or that suggests that 
operations were conducted under these names. 
Nevertheless, these testimonies seem to reveal another, apparently significant undercurrent of police 
atrocities in the North Rift. Our sources mention a high level of political complicity in these security 
operations. “Police can’t be trusted because they are under control themselves”. “Politicians use police 
to get their agendas”182. Respondents to the KHRC claimed how “police respond to the MPs but not 
to any conflicts”183.  Disarmament operations in and around Samburu indeed appeared to be biased 
with most of them targeting the Samburu population. Some even suggest that the Borana cattle raids 
and the security operations that came in their wake were all part of a larger plan. The KNCHR writes 
that leaders of the Turkana and Samburu communities allege that the Borana raid was conducted to 
provoke a reaction from the Samburu and that the Samburu rejoinder raid was staged and anticipated 
to justify the need for a disarmament operation that was supposed to result in the eviction of Samburu 
communities from their lands or even large scale murder.
However, great uncertainty and disagreement surrounds this matter. Other sources deny the existence 
of such a plan. And the question remains as to what purpose such a plan would serve. Would it be a 
mere political ploy? A game of numbers to assure political influence and votes in the region? Some 
sources suggest that it cannot be seen apart from large scale Chinese development projects in the area 
and that the whole set-up was made to evict Samburu from their lands as to provide a free passage for 
these projects184(BOX 7). This would indeed be a clear example of how economic and political motives 
go hand in hand. However, here too remains a great deal of uncertainty. We can neither confirm or deny 
the existence of such encompassing plans, whatever their goals might be. More investigation into the 
matter is needed. Nevertheless, it is likely that there is a degree of political complicity and control in 
security operations and that this might indeed result in police conduct that does not correspond to the 
official objectives of the respective operations.  
In line with this presumed complicity of politicians in security operations lies the assumption  that a lot 
of police conduct was ethnically motivated (since politics largely follows ethnic lines). This assumption is 
endorsed by our own research. The same feelings of belonging and antipathies, the same sets of ethnically 
shaped collective memories, grievances that we have depicted before seem to be directive of conflict 
behaviour among security personnel. In this, police resemble the warriors and local administrators. In 
Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia police officers too, were caught up “between two fires”. And often they let 
their ethnic affiliations prevail over their duties and responsibilities as government personnel. Among 
Kenyan security personnel stereotype images of other communities are as much alive as with the rest 
of society and the armed groups. “They belong to a part of society in which this is normal” the police 
officer testified185. According to some sources this is also what caused the excessively violent and biased 
security operations in Samburu District. “Ethnic affiliations are important for police officers too”186.“Police 
too have stereotypical thinking”, Samburu residents testified187. The KCHR reports a testimony of Archers 
Post residents claiming that sending police to their area is often of little help since a lot of the police 
officers “have very bad perceptions” towards them which allegedly leads them to “instigate more 
violence” and “simply fuel the conflict even more”188. Because in the military too, ethnic memberships are 
important ethnicity cannot be excluded as a motivational mindset for military excesses and brutalities. 
However, the fact that military would let things drift during these events can also be ascribed to their 
official agenda which did not include forceful intervention in cases of violence. Of course this stands as a 
direct opposite to excessive military violence against Kenyan civilians during the post election violence 
in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia  and in other regions at other times. 
By the same token our research revealed how police forces in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia were often 
simply overwhelmed by the marauding groups who acted fast, in large numbers and highly organized. 
182 Confidential telephone interview IPIS, April 2011. 
183 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p.8
184 Confidential communication, March – April 2011 (email); Cultural Survival, When the Police are the Perpetrators: An Investigation 
of Human Rights Violations by Police In Samburu East and Isiolo Districts, Kenya, 2010, p.18.
185 Interview with Police Officer conducted in Langas Estate, September 2009.
186 Telephone interview IPIS with Fred Lesakale, April 2011. 
187 Telephone interview IPIS with Michael Lolwerikoi, April 2011
188 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Fact-Finding Mission of Cattle Rustling in Samburu and Isiolo, 2009, p11.
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 In the name of development and conservation; Notes on links between Chinese development, Box 7. 
the AWF and State-coordinated violence in Samburu.  
At the crossroads between political and economic stakes of conflict in the North Rift and police atrocities 
we find two very interesting stories that call for further investigation. In their accounts of the brutal security 
operations that took place in Samburu District our respondents mention two interesting stakeholders namely 
Chinese companies and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). 
Firstly, the complicity of Chinese companies in the area is allegedly to be seen in the light of oil explorations in 
the neighbourhood and their involvement in a large scale development project named LAPSSET (the acronym 
for ‘Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport’). We came across a number of documents and pictures that 
confirm the existence of this project, the involvement of Chinese companies in it and its trajectory through 
Samburu District. The LAPSSET project is supposed to link the proposed new port (and airport) of Lamu 
with various towns in the North Rift (Maralal, Lodwar, Lokichoggio, Archers Post, …) and other regions and 
eventually with Ethiopia through Moyale and Sudan through Lokichoggio. This transport corridor will consist 
of railways, highways and oil pipelines. In addition to this resort cities and free trade zones are supposed to 
be constructed in Lamu, Isiolo, and at the tip of Lake Turkana (possibly comparable to the Sseesamirembe 
Eco City project on the shores of Lake Victoria in Uganda)1. It is believed that the implementations of these 
developments Kenyan cannot be considered apart from rises in violence by the hands of security forces and 
militias.  
In the margins of all this, 
Chinese presence in the 
area seems to parallel steep 
increases in elephant poaching 
(from six animals in 2007 to 57 
in 2009). Recently a Channel 
4 crew documented how 
ivory is allegedly ordered 
by and smuggled to China. 
Their documentation showed 
evidence of well organized 
poachers armed with AK-
47’s not only resorting to 
elephant poaching but also 
to indiscriminate killings of 
Samburu residents2. 
Secondly, conservancy 
projects play are said to play 
an important role in evictions 
and killings in Samburu. These 
allegations are supported by Cultural Survival who write that heavily armed policemen forcibly evicted 300 
Samburu families from their lands in Laikipia. Police reportedly burned the Samburu’s houses and all their 
properties. According to Cultural Survival former president Daniel Arap Moi purchased this land during his 
administration and recently sold it to the AWF that wants to create a conservation corridor for wildlife, along 
with “sustainable livestock grazing and other community development projects”3. Recently, a Channel 4 crew 
documented such evictions and burnings by security personnel and made similar allegations4. 
1 Kenya Ports Authority, Kenya Ports Authority Handbook 2010-2011, Land & Marine Publications Ltd., 2010, pp.26-33; 
Kenya National Assembly, National Assembly Official Report, Tuesday 1st September, 2009, 2009, pp.9-10. 
2 Hartley A, Unreported World: The End of the Elephant?, 26 March 2010 (Channel 4).
3 Cultural Survival, Samburu Evicted for Conservation in Kenya, 15 December 2010; 
4 Steeds O., Dispatches: Conservation’s Dirty Secrets, 17 June 2011 (Channel 4).
 Chinese bulldozer near Samburu - Isiolo Border. (Photo: Tina Ramme, 2009).
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The reason for this is firstly to be found in either a lack of intelligence or a lack of communication. Secondly, 
police non-response can be retraced to a sheer shortage in numbers and equipment. According to 
our informants the police were heavily outnumbered by the armed groups most of the times. At the 
beginning of the post election violence no more than 600 police officers were present in the whole 
Uasin Gishu district. Besides this, most local police stations were badly equipped leaving them unable 
to correctly respond to the situation189. Hence, apart from ethnic motives the laxity in their response or 
their non-response could be motivated by their unwillingness to endanger their own lives.  
Police personnel in Samburu and Turkana are confronted with the exact same problems. Although 
political interference and ethnic bias provide partial explanations our research suggests that these 
explanations do not cover the whole scope of police conduct. The story of the Turkana warriors taking 
care of their police officers shows that in this region it is often the local pastoral militia that protects ‘their’ 
police than the other way round. This depends a lot on the relative strength of the different forces on 
the ground.  As in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia police laxity or unwillingness to intervene can partly be 
explained as a survival tactic. Local police forces are often reluctant to intervene because they are poorly 
equipped and do not have sufficient intelligence to rely on. Since they are often confronted with large 
groups of well equipped, heavily armed raiders they often decide not to intervene. “Local police forces 
are generally unprepared and too afraid to engage in confrontations with organized warrior groups”190. 
In addition to this, the actions of security personnel often show a significant degree of greed and 
opportunistic motivations. Looting, theft and so on can be explained by reference to the wish to enrich 
themselves. Generally underpaid, police personnel could have been tempted to replenish their incomes 
with whatever they could grab during the security operations. 
A last but very important explanation that concerns both police and army personnel is again the pervasive 
culture of impunity that also affects the security forces. Hence, our writings regarding unaccountability 
of armed groups, politicians and officials also apply to the police and army forces. Since the 1990’s 
both police and army personnel have been repeatedly accused of excessive violence, theft and extra-
judicial killings but very rarely have they been brought to court and adequately sentenced for their 
actions191. Various organisations have investigated the issue on various occasions but very little was 
done to implement the conclusions and recommendations made in their reports192. Today the former 
Commissioner of the Kenya Police Mohamed Hussein Ali is to stand before the ICC at The Hague. Some 
reforms have been implemented and more are scheduled. However, most violence remains unpunished 
and injustices remain unsettled. 
The above demonstrates that we have to remain nuanced in our account of police and military 
behaviour. Although testimonies of political complicity and high level involvement in the organisation 
of these operations are so widespread that they need to be taken into account, research reveals that 
such explanations alone are not sufficient. Ordinary police officers are members of an ethnic community 
often with strong feelings of ethnic affiliation. They are at the fringes themselves, underequipped, 
underpaid, in a continuous struggle to survive.  Consequently, they often resort to practices that oppose 
their official responsibilities apart from any orders given to them by higher authorities. 
189 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August – September 2009; See also: Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 
2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, The Cry of Blood: Report on Extra-Judicial Killings and Disappearances, 2008.
190 Telephone interview IPIS with Carolyn Lesorogol, April 2011.
191 Interviews conducted in Uasin Gishu District, August – September 2009; See also: Waki Commission, The Waki Report, Nairobi, 
2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, The Cry of Blood: Report on Extra-Judicial Killings and Disappearances, 
2008.
192 Human Rights Watch, “All the Men Have Gone”: Ware Crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon Conflict, Human Rights Watch, 2008; Human 
Rights Watch, “Bring the Gun or You’ll Die”: Torture, Rape and Other Serious Human Rights Violations by the Kenyan Security Forces 
in the Mandera Triangle,  Human Rights Watch, 2009; Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions; Mission to Kenya, United Nations Human Rights Council, 26 May 2009.
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Fighting at the Fringes - Notes on State Periphery and Illegitimacy Box 8. 
In writing on armed groups, politicians and security personnel we have touched upon issues of State 
functioning. The rise of ethnically motivated warrior groups parallels difficulties of the Kenyan State in 
providing basic needs and livelihoods to its citizens.  It also reflects the incapability of the State to act with 
strength and meaningful legitimacy. Through years of structural neglect and marginalization, a periphery 
has emerged in which state presence and policies are openly ambiguated, questioned and contested. These 
margins of the state are not only geographical but also, and even more so, socio-economic contexts in which 
ethnic identities, affiliations and contestation along ethno-cultural boundaries are focused. 
Ironically, as we have demonstrated, these margins are brought about by the State, its institutions and its 
representatives themselves. Through these the State seems to undo itself. Politicians go against the State 
they claim to represent because they build political careers on social formations and identities that present 
themselves as the exact opposites of those that the nation-state  propagates. 
Next to this the Kenyan State creates its own fringes when it presents itself as a dominant and aggressive 
power at the grassroots while it fails to correctly manage its ‘nurturing’ and protective institutions. The ability 
of the state to act with legitimate dominance and aggression is highly questioned and contested when it 
fails to manage its ‘softer’ services as health care, education and social security. When its security forces strike 
with great brutality at the grassroots. When police officers engage in extrajudicial killings while, at the same 
time its judiciary system fails to bring justice to victims, thousands of people face starvation, health care is 
abominable, historical grievances are left unsettled and so on. In these contexts the Kenyan State creates its 
own peripheries in which the people not only question its legitimacy but also turn towards exactly those 
social formations for protection, comfort and identification that the post-colonial (Kenyan) nation-state was 
supposed to undo.
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Conclusion
In the North Rift Region the districts of Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia  , Turkana, Samburu and Laikipia have 
suffered and continue to bare the brunt of armed violence. Whereas Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia   have 
experienced armed conflict mostly in the context of the latest post election violence in 2007 and 2009. 
Samburu and Laikipia suffered an unusual increase of armed violence in the shape of pastoral raids and 
excessive security operations in 2009. At its turn Turkana was the most violent district in the North Rift in 
2009 and 2010 with high numbers of deadly casualties due to pastoral conflicts. 
Most of the violence can be ascribed to armed groups affiliated to the ethnic communities in the region. 
Equipped with crude weapons but also, and ever more so with automatic rifles these so called ‘warrior’ 
groups engage in numerous violent raids and confrontations. These cannot be explained by reference 
to one single motive. On the contrary, the motivations underpinning the actions of armed groups are all 
situated on a broad scope that combines, amongst others, mere survival strategies with waged violence 
and politically instigated ethnic antipathies. 
Consequently, an analysis of conflict in the North Rift implies not only an investigation into the motives 
and behaviour of armed groups but also an assessment of those who act behind the screens. Local and 
high-level power figures and other prominent community members are often driving forces behind 
political violence and destructive raids. They are accused of facilitating, financing, inciting and organizing 
raids because of ethnic sensitivities or to safeguard their personal, political and economic interests.  In 
order to reach their agendas politicians turn to the extremes of identity politics inciting people against 
each other through appeals on seemingly incompatible cultural identities. 
We also discussed the actions and motivations of Kenyan Security Personnel. Their official objectives 
are related to restoring security in a conflict torn region. Unfortunately this does very rarely correspond 
Samburu refugees in Laikipia (Photo: Tina Ramme, 2009).
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to their actions that can often be retraced to survival and greed motivations and ethnic bias. Besides 
this, security personnel is thought to operate under the control of politicians and higher authorities  for 
political reasons or to pave the way for large scale development and conservancy projects. 
All actors move within a pervasive culture of impunity and a general situation of state insufficiency and 
illegitimacy where very little is undertaken to bring perpetrators to court and justice to the grass roots 
and where the Kenyan State fails to provide basic and necessary services to its citizens. Consequently 
they force them to rely only on themselves and on social formations that thrive in the margins of the 
State. 
As this illustrates, in analysing the motivations of conflict actors in the North Rift Region we essentially 
touched upon a number of issues that are characteristic for the whole Kenyan society. The behaviour of 
our actors is rooted in a situation of profound inequality depicted by increasing possibilities at the top 
of the hierarchy and equally increasing hardships at the bottom end. 
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acronyms
AP – Administration Police
ASAL – Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
AWF – African Wildlife Foundation
GSU – General Service Unit 
ICC – International Criminal Court
IDP – Internally Displaced Person 
KHRC – Kenya Human Rights Commission
KNCHR – Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KPR – Kenya Police Reserve
NGO – Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA – (United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCPD – Officer Commanding Police Division
OCS – Officer Commanding Police Station
ODM – Orange Democratic Movement
OHCHR – (United Nations) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PAPC – Provincial Administration Police Commander
PNU – Party of National Unity
PPO – Provincial Police Officer
RDU – Rapid Deployment Unit 
SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SAR – Small Arms Survey 
SLDF – Sabaot Land Defence Force 
TOW – Tube Launched Optically Wire Guided
